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ABSTRACT
DEVELOPMENT OF RISK UNCERTAINTY FACTORS FROM HISTORICAL NASA
PROJECTS
Tahani R. Amer
Old Dominion University, 2011
Director: Dr. C. Ariel Pinto
NASA is a good investment of federal funds and strives to provide the best value to
the nation. NASA has consistently budgeted to unrealistic cost estimates, which are
evident in the cost growth in many of its programs. In this investigation, NASA has been
using available uncertainty factors from the Aerospace Corporation, Air Force, and Booz
Allen Hamilton to develop projects' risk posture. NASA has no insight into the
developmental of these factors and, as demonstrated here, this can lead to unrealistic risks
in many NASA Programs and projects (P/p). The primary contribution of this project is
the development of NASA missions' uncertainty factors, from actual historical NASA
projects, to aid cost-estimating as well as for independent reviews which provide NASA
senior management with information and analysis to determine the appropriate decision
regarding P/p. In general terms, this research project advances programmatic analysis for
NASA projects.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
ill1hi,•<:••tire dillhalt IK/OI\ //-n , » V :S\
- TIKhiii.is Fuller

1.1 Background
NASA's Space Flight Programs and projects (P/p) are considered highly visible
national assets and priorities. The Agency's strategic plan articulates these space flight
goals and the timetable for reaching them. P/p management translates the strategy into the
actions needed to achieve these goals. Thus, NASA defines the requirements for effective
P/p management to fulfill its mandate and commitments. From NASA's perspective,
there is a distinction between the Program and project. Program is a strategic investment
that has a defined architecture, technical approach, requirements, funding level, and
management structure that initiate and direct one or more projects. A Project is a specific
investment identified in a program plan and has defined requirements, a life-cycle cost, a
beginning, and an end. A project yields new or revised products that directly address
NASA's strategic needs.
The purpose of the independent life-cycle reviews (ILCR) of P/p is to ensure mission
success. These formal reviews, with selected team members, provide an independent
assessment of emerging designs against plans, processes, and requirements to ensure an
objective assessment of the design and development plans. By having independent
experts conduct these reviews, the review team provides a unique view that a P/p may
have overlooked as a consequence of their close involvement with the ongoing P/p work.
A major P/p goes through an ILCR, which is the analysis of a proposed P/p by an
independent team composed of management, technical, and programmatic experts from

outside the P/p management authority. It provides NASA management with an
independent assessment of the readiness of the P/p to proceed. There are three objectives
for conducting ILCRs:

1. The Agency wants the P/p to receive independent assurance that they will achieve
mission success.
2. The NASA senior management, associate administrators, center directors, and the
NASA Chief Engineer all need to understand that the P/p is meeting its
commitments, is performing according to plan, and that externally impediments are
addressed. By conducting ILCR, senior management gains understanding of the P/p
status and can make informative decisions relative to the P/p.
3. NASA needs to provide its external stakeholders, such as the Office of Management
& Budget (OMB), Congress, and policy makers, the assurance that NASA is
meeting its commitment. Its external stakeholders require reviews at major
milestones to ensure sufficient management involvement in the decision process
prior to continuing into the next phase. The intent of ILCRs imposed on P/p is to
ensure mission success. The Standing Review Board (SRB) is an advisory body and
can provide recommendations during the key decision points (KDPs) within the P/p
life-cycle.
The NASA Convening Authority (CA), which is composed of associate
administrators, center directors, and the NASA Chief Engineer, reviews these
recommendations and makes one of the following decisions based on the results of the
ILCR:
a. Confirm the P/p to the next phase-continue
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b. De-scope P/p requirements and objectives
c. Cancel the P/p
d. Provide more resources to the P/p to meet requirements
1.2 Details of the Independent Life-Cycle Review
A significant additional benefit to the P/p is that preparation for the milestone review
requires the P/p managers and team to examine holistic progress against specific criteria
for each milestone. This permits both the development team and the independent review
team to see how well the work is progressing and to examine the assumptions and
analyses that support the conclusion the P/p has reached regarding its maturity and
readiness to proceed.
The depth of the independent review is to the extent at which the review board can
determine that the entire design holds together adequately, and that the analyses,
development work, systems engineering and programmatic (e.g., cost, schedule, etc.)
support the design and the decisions that were made. Typically, this requires evaluation
of the work at the system level. Additionally, the independent review function is
identifying cost, schedule, and technical performance risks as well as identifies the
consequences of P/p success.
The independent P/p reviews usually examine the following six criteria for P/p:
1. Alignment with N AS A Go als
2. Management Adequacy
3. Technical Adequacy
4. Integrated Cost and Schedule Adequacy
5. Resource Adequacy
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6. Risk Management Adequacy
As part of the independent review, focus is on the risk assessment of the P/p. Risk is
the pressures to meet cost, schedule, and technical performance which are the practical
realities in engineering today's systems [Haimes, 2004]. Risk is defined, if it occurs, as
the combination of the probability that a P/p will experience an undesirable event and the
consequences, impact, or severity of the undesired event. The undesirable event may
come from technical or programmatic sources (e.g., a cost overrun, schedule slippage,
safety mishap, health problem, malicious activities, environmental impact failure to
achieve a needed scientific or technological objective, or success criterion.) The technical
and programmatic sources are interdependent and interrelated, thus one cannot separate
theses sources. Managing risk is managing the inherent contention that exists within and
across all these dimensions. Both the probability and consequences may have associated
uncertainties. Risk assessment (see Figure 1) is an evaluation of a risk item that
determines (Haimes, 2004):
1. What can go wrong?
2. How likely is it to occur?
3. What are the consequences?
4. What are the uncertainties associated with the likelihood and consequences?
5. What are the trade-offs?
6. What are the future impacts?
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Figure 1. Six Risk Management Questions (Haimes, 2004)
These six risk management questions were developed by Haimes in 2004 and have
been used in the field of risk management since then.
There are several other organizations and agencies that use the methodology of
independent reviews for their P/p that have a high level of complexity and have a lifecycle cost of $500 million and more. Federal agencies such as the Department of Defense
(DOD), Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), National Institutes of Health (NIH), and
Department of Energy (DOE) use independent reviews to assess and evaluate their P/p.
Independent reviews for a P/p with a life-cycle cost over $250 million are required by
law to report their progress to Congress and the OMB. Three elements that must be
evaluated during these reviews are: (1) technical issues, (2) cost, and (3) schedule.
Stakeholders require an evaluation and integration of these elements. Currently,
cost/schedule analysts conduct a separate technical, cost, and schedule analysis, not an
integrated method. Moreover, NASA NPR 1000.5 initiated the requirement to perform
integrated cost and schedule analyses for major P/p at a specific decision point.
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1.3 Research Objectives
The objective of this research is to develop uncertainty factors from NASA's actual
historical project data to be used to classify risk for future cost estimations. Additionally,
it supports the independent reviews which inform NASA senior management to make the
right decision regarding the project's progress. This research is to provide a tool to assess
project risks and provide more informative data for stakeholders and decision-makers.
1.4 Project Research Problem Areas
This dissertation focused on four core problem areas. Solution approaches were
developed for each area in the form of analytic methodologies.
Problem Area 1
Determine NASA projects from which to gather data as it relates to cost
growth for science missions.
Problem Area 2
Develop a method to evaluate NASA historical projects' cost by collecting
coherent dataset.
Problem Area 3
Develop NASA uncertainty factors (NUFs) by capturing the trend of growth
data from the selected science missions and comparing these factors with
other uncertainty factors.
Problem Area 4
Bring together research and uncertainty factors developed in Problem Areas 1
through 3 into a coherent tool to be used in the quantification of risk for future
NASA projects.
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Figure 2 captures the project problem areas in a graphical format that includes the
data collection method, data analysis, selection of missions, and testing and validation of
the results.
%
\
Problem %
Area 4 +
*»

Figure 2. Research Project and Problem Area Relationship
1.5 Research Contribution
This project's contribution is to develop NASA mission uncertainty factors from
actual historical NASA projects to support cost estimating and independent reviews. This
provides NASA senior management with information and analysis to determine the
appropriate decision regarding P/p at KDPs. These factors are tested and evaluated by
statistical methods and the lognormal distribution is developed.

CHAPTER 2
BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY

2.1 Literature Review
This section separates the literature review into sub-problems in order to be able to
cover related material (see Figure 3).

Figure 3. Research Project Problem and its Sub-Problems Literature Review
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Risk management has been a major focus of NASA's culture. Risk management is
defined by Ruckelshaus (1985) as the process by which the Agency decides what action
to take in the face of risk estimates. Pinto (2006) has stated that risk management can be
described in terms of two sets of activities: risk assessment and risk mitigation. Risk
assessment can be summarized by posing the following questions (Kaplan, 1981): What
can go wrong? What is the likelihood that it could go wrong? What are the
consequences? After risks have been assessed, the following questions have to be posed
for risk mitigation: What can be done? What are the tradeoffs? What are the impacts on
future options? In this report, sustainable management of risk is accomplished by
describing frameworks for: (1) valuation of avoided risks, and (2) improving outsourced
information security services. NASA's risk assessment method is to avoid risk and
mitigate it as described by Pinto's perspective.
Additionally, Schuyler has defined risk analysis as the discipline of helping decisionmakers choose wisely under conditions of uncertainty. The quality of decision impacts
cost, schedule, and performance. Most decision problems are about resource allocation:
where do we put the money, time, and other resources? Decision analysis involves
concepts borrowed from probability theory, statistics, psychology, finance, operations
research, and management science. Also, Schuyler stated that decision analysis provides
the only logical, consistent way to incorporate judgments about risks and uncertainties
into an analysis. Decision analysts have to do a credible analysis that must have two main
characteristics: objectivity and precision. In NASA, decisions are made in all levels of the
project, but understanding risk that is associated with cost is not a clear concept at
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NASA. Moreover, Arena (2006) stated that risk analysis has three areas: risk assessment,
risk management, and risk communication, which interconnect and influence each other.
Cooper (2003) discussed the relationship between stakeholder expectations and
project risk. NASA, as the sponsor for interplanetary exploration, provides the funding
and oversight for the development and operation of all missions. However, the ultimate
determination of the success or failure of any flight project is the responsibility of the
stakeholders. The author developed the diagram below (Figure 4) to show the
relationships of external and internal factors, communication, and inter-connectivity/
influence of each other.

Affected B\

Team Members

Organization

NASA

The Public

e Public

Figure 4. Success and/or Failure of a Flight Project (Cooper, 2003)
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Cooper's paper addressed the extension of project risk management practices to
address the management of stakeholder expectations. This concept establishes the criteria
for a project's success/failure and motivates stakeholder actions. The project team will
understand the stakeholders' concerns and make decisions that consider the potential
impacts on the stakeholders. Through his paper is in conceptual phase, it includes a
stakeholder perspective which has the potential to contribute to the overall risk
management effort of a project.
More specific to NASA, Connelly (2004) wrote a paper regarding Integrated Risk
Management within NASA P/p. This paper states that "the integrating risk across people,
processes, and project requirements/constraints serves to enhance decisions, strengthen
communication pathways, and reinforces the ability of the project team to identify and
manage risks across the broad spectrum of project management responsibilities." Also,
the author asserts that applying an integrated approach to risk management makes it
possible to do a better job at balancing safety, cost, schedule, operational performance,
and other risk elements. Integrated risk management brings project management and
engineering processes together to help decision-makers make better decisions. Risk
management is a deliberate activity, involves a systematic process, and covers the entire
project life-cycle. Thus, integrated risk management is a process that involves the
understanding of roles and responsibilities of all stakeholders on the project team.
Additionally, NASA has a Risk Management Procedural Requirement, NPR 8000.4,
that is designed to identify, analyze and plan, track, and control risk to increase the
likelihood of achieving P/p goals. It enables the Project Manager to manage the risks of
the P/p. It is also a standardization process and a tool to assist all NASA P/p to develop a

12
risk management plan. However, it does not look at the independent review aspect of
risks and it does not address the evaluation method of risk within the project.
There is a limited amount of research and documentation regarding NASA's risk
management P/p. However, this concept continues to evolve and a great deal of focus and
energy are being spent to successfully integrate the risk management process across the
P/p life-cycle. Various processes, tools, and techniques, management involvement, and
stakeholder monitoring, all must perform and function together to achieve mission
success. Every P/p undergoes an ILCR, which is the analysis of a proposed P/p by an
independent team composed of management, technical, and resource experts. This team
evaluates the cost, schedule, and technical performance, and provides an integrated risk
assessment of the P/p to senior management. Additionally, the team conducts risk
analysis, which allows decision-makers to get a better understanding of the range of
possible outcomes of any decision and to identify known risk areas from experts in the
field. Understanding cost and schedule risks are important components of decisionmaking. Decision-makers seek to understand the risks taken for association with the
Agency's investment in order to make an appropriate decision.
Cost growth is a problem experienced by many types of projects in many fields of
research. The measurement of cost growth has been inconsistent across programs, NASA
Centers, and Congress. The Government Accountability Office and Congress generally
consider the baseline to be the first time a mission appears as a budget line item in an
appropriations bill, which is often before a preliminary design review. The contents of
NASA estimates differ from each other and may include:
-

Phases A and B, some start with Phase C,

13
Launch costs and/or mission operations, and/or
-

NASA oversight and internal project management costs.

These differences make it difficult to develop a clear understanding of trends in cost
growth. Thus, different studies reach different conclusions, because they examine
different sets of missions and calculate cost growth based on different criteria. By
definition, cost growth is a relative measure reflecting comparison of an initial estimate
of mission costs against costs actually incurred at a later time (National Research
Council, 2010). This study considers only development costs.
Cost growth affects the risk of P/p. There is a great deal of literature that addresses
risk and risk management in engineering research environments. Figure 3 provides a
quick look at the literature review of this research.
NASA P/p conducts internal reviews to establish and manage the P/p baseline. P/p are
required to document in their P/p Plans their approach to conducting P/p internal reviews
and how they will support the independent life-cycle reviews. ILCRs are conducted by a
SRB.
-

The SRB has a single chairperson and a NASA Review Manager.

-

The SRB remains intact, with the goal of having the same core
membership for the duration of the P/p.

-

SRB members must be independent of the P/p and some members must be
independent of the Center(s) responsible for the P/p.
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In the article entitled, "Building Better Boards, Harvard Business Review" by David
Nadler (2004), Nadler discussed the difficulty of board building and the length of time it
requires. Any board should have certain characteristics, such as the right mind set, the
right role, the right work, the right people, the right agenda, the right information, and the
right culture. Also, the article mentioned board building contributes not only to
performance, but also to member satisfaction as an important element. This article
provided a relevant perspective on cooperative boards that is very similar to independent
review boards that evaluate NASA P/p.
In Dillon paper (2003), he addressed the fact that managers of complex engineering
development projects face a challenge when deciding how to allocate scarce resources to
minimize the risk of project failure. A new model called the Advanced Programmatic
Risk Analysis and Management (APRAM), describes a decision-support framework for
the management of the risk of failures of dependent engineering within projects. The
model aids the decision-maker in making an informed decision on a top level risk and
determines the optimal allocation of resources. Also, the model provides a proactive
approach to making risk take-offs under tight resource constraints. The author concludes
that NASA is challenged within the current government environment, thus it needs better
risk management and independent review of technical projects.
NASA has been and continues to work the risk analysis issue. During a Cost-Risk
Workshop at Langley Research Center (LaRC), Coonce (2008) stated that "the purpose
of this workshop was to explain why NASA must improve its cost and schedule
estimating methods, show forthcoming probabilistic estimating and budgeting policy, and
explain the fundamentals of probabilistic estimating." The author stated that NASA's
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current projects have exceeded their launch dates by 56% and cost estimates by 64%. The
cost and schedule growth are adversely affecting other projects in the portfolio as well as
damaging reputation and credibility with stakeholders. In this workshop, the author stated
that major NASA projects must submit budgets at a 70% confidence level (CL) starting at
the initial phase of the project. Figure 5 shows the different cost estimating methods used
NASA-wide. There are three methods of cost estimating parametric, analogous, and
engineering (bottom up), for each phase of flight project. Estimates created using a
parametric approach are based on historical data and mathematical expressions relating
cost as the dependent variable to selected, independent, cost-driving variables through
regression analysis. Analogy estimates are performed on the basis of comparison and
extrapolation to like items or efforts. Cost data from a past program that is technically
representative of the program to be estimated serves as the basis of the estimate.
The engineering method is sometimes referred to as "grass roots" or "bottom-up"
estimating. The engineering build up methodology is rolls up individual estimates for
each element into the overall estimate. This costing methodology involves the
computation of the cost of a WBS element by estimating at the lowest level of detail
(often referred to as the "work package" level), wherein the resources to accomplish the
work effort are readily distinguishable and discernible. Currently at NASA, there is more
emphasis on the parametric method.
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Figure 5. NASA-Wide Cost Estimating Methods (NASA Cost Estimating Handbook,
2008)
To realistically implement the 70% CL estimate policy, the P/p must: be completely
transparent on how their estimate was derived and allow sufficient time for the other
party to understand it; provide a basis for their respective base estimates; and provide
rationale and data to explain how they derived their probability distributions. NASA
Policy Directive (NPD 1000.5) has placed a new requirement on the P/p that P/p must
comply with the new requirement in order to approve funding.
There are several developmental processes and methods to integrate the cost and
schedule that are underway in the risk estimating field. Smart (2007) performed research
on cost and schedule relationships and developed a cost model that implemented funding
profiles with cost caps, cost impacts on schedule, and schedule impacts on cost. Smart
stated that cost and schedule are highly correlated. For example, if the schedule slips, the
cost will increase. Cost and schedule are mathematically correlated, but there is no tested
and verified model that is equipped to handle cost and schedule jointly. In reality, cost
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and schedule estimates are analyzed and developed independently of one another. Most
of NASA P/p incur schedule overruns, thus when schedule increases, costs increase due
to a stretching of the funding profile. See Figure 6.
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Figure 6. Cost Penalties Due to Changes in Schedule (Smart, 2007)

In conclusion, Smart stated that cost growth is sensitive to schedule growth and
developed several algorithms for the effect of schedule expansion, schedule compression,
and funding caps on cost. His research resulted in NASA beginning an integrated
approach to cost, schedule, and risk assessment. Moreover, the Quantitative Techniques
Incorporating Phasing and Schedule (QTIPS) model has been developed from Smart's
research and several NASA cost and schedule analysts use this model in their analyses.
Another method was developed by David Hulett (2007). Hulett presented his paper at
the 2007 NASA Project Management Challenge. He stated that schedule risk analysis is
dependent on one-path schedule that has two branches: risk and probabilistic. Schedule is
managed using Microsoft® Project, but cost is managed using Microsoft® Excel. Hulett
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developed the pictorial shown in Figure 7 to show integration of cost and schedule on
project risk.

Cost and Schedule Risk Integration

© 2007 Hulett & Associates LLC

Figure 7. Cost and Schedule Risk Integration (Hulett, 2007)
Additionally, Hulett (2007) stated that schedule risk depends on the schedule logic
and an uncertainty in the activity duration and also that Monte Carlo simulation is the
acceptable method of estimating uncertainty from all risks. Cost risk depends on
schedule uncertainty, uncertainty in burning rates, and uncertainty for time-independent
costs.
Moreover, Parsons (2007) stated that problems are better prevented than solved. Data
is critical for detecting and predicting potential problems; and the purpose of an
independent review is to predict and plan for any risk that the project cannot detect. The
independent cost and schedule analysts usually use technical and programmatic data from
early missions and projects to populate their models. Thus, using a data mining package
and models to predict future project risk is the core of the independent review's objective.
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NASA has implemented independent reviews to assess future projects using formal
project data.
Steven Grey's book entitled, "Practical Risk Assessment for Project Management,"
showed how to accomplish a quantitative cost and schedule risk analysis of projects and
explained how to apply the same methods to forecasting revenue/profits in a project's
business. These assessments are conducted independently and are not integrated.
Additionally, he stated that risk models are evaluated by Monte Carlo simulation, such as
the @RISK Simulation tool. He addressed the cost risk by assessing the uncertainty in the
project's costs, breaking down the total cost into parts, describing the uncertainty in each
part, and then putting the parts back together to give a whole picture. The standard way to
break down a project is by the implementation of a work breakdown structure (WBS).
The schedule risk is represented in terms of a network of linked activities with a logical
structure, a more complex structure rather than a list of costs to be added. Thus, a basic
form of a schedule risk model is: a network with all the dependencies between activities;
a three-point estimate for the durations of all activities including contingencies and lags
on links; definitions of correlation between estimates; and the probabilities associated
with branching points. Finally, the author referenced several application tools, such as,
@RISK for Microsoft® Project, Crystal Ball, Predict, and Monte Carlo by Primavera to
be used to develop risk assessment of projects.

2.2 NASA Specifics
In the 2001 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report, the GAO stated that
NASA does not have a performance measure that directly addresses the space station cost
control or risk mitigation activities and contingency planning. The Program lacks a risk
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management plan and lacks an understanding of all aspects of the risk and its associated
cost. This report has emphasized the need to understand risk and how it relates to P/p
success.
Bitten et al. (2005) have shown that schedule restrictions imposed on planetary
missions by fixed launch dates create higher failure rates and appear to have more cost
growth due to schedule restrictions. NASA studies observed that planetary missions fail
at a rate markedly higher than that of Earth-orbiting missions. They examined the
relationship between schedule and risk for planetary missions; the data included 38
NASA missions. They focused on the development time and operational status and found
that of the 3.9% of missions that experienced schedule growth, 30% were successful,
40%) were impaired, and 30% experienced catastrophic failure rates. They recommended
that development time for planetary science should be greater than 36 months and should
be closer to 46 months to be consistent with the average development time for successful
missions. This research provides a great approach for data analysis of historic NASA
planetary science missions that could be evaluated for this current research. Additionally,
it emphasizes the need to understand the cost and schedule relationship.
Kellogg and Phan (2002) developed an approach for estimating the costs of spacebased instruments by using actual costs from historical instruments. They tested their
approach with the NASA Goddard cost model for verification. They concluded that
analogy based estimating was a powerful tool for cost estimators to use, especially in the
early conceptual design phase. For this research, uncertainty factors are to be developed
from NASA historical data, which is similar in methodology to that which Kellogg and
Phan have recommended. Bitten, Emmons, and Freaner (2005) have addressed the
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question of funding profile on cost and schedule growth. The initial funding profile
provided by a mission is one of many factors that can contribute to the cost and schedule
growth of a mission. The results of their study indicated that certain initial funding
profiles may minimize cost and schedule growth. Finally, they stated that the best choice
of funding profile is made after fully understanding the development challenges of the
mission, the mission development time required to successfully implementing the
mission, mission requirements, and the mission acquisition approach. The authors have
provided guidance as follows:
•

A more balanced profile (45%-55% beta curve) may limit cost & schedule
growth.
A more back-loaded funding profile is better for missions with longer
development times.

•

A front-loaded profile could be managed to retain large reserves during
early phases that could be carried over to later phases. This option is the
best, if managed properly, and provides the most flexibility for early risk
mitigation and responds to problems that occur in integration and testing
(I&T).

This study provided correlation between the funding profile, cost, and schedule
growth, which is an element that needs to be considered within this current project. Also,
this study provides a primary source of information on NASA's fiscal year budget.

Bitten, Emmons, and Freaner have studied NASA cost and schedule growth to set
reserved guidelines for future P/p. They stated that the current average cost reserve is on
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the order of 19% and 8% for schedule reserve for each project. From the study of 40
missions, they recommended an addition of 14% cost reserve at the program level over
and above the 19% cost reserves that typically has been held at the project level. They
also recommended increasing the schedule reserve to 19% in lieu of 8%. Additionally,
they provided best practices for controlling cost and schedule growth in their paper and
provided a comparison to industry guidelines and rule of thumb. This paper's approach is
very clear and relevant to the current project of defining and categorizing the causes of
cost and schedule growth for 40 missions. NASA did not embrace the result of this paper,
but NASA has set a new policy since then.
The National Research Council report of 2010 entitled, "Controlling Cost Growth of
NASA Earth and Space Science Missions," has focused on changes in NASA policy that
would reduce or eliminate the cost growth. The report showed a very interesting trend of
cost growth in the last several decades (Table 1).

Table 1. Decadal Trends in Cost Growth for NASA Missions
Cost Growth
Median (%)
Average (%)
26
1970s
43
61,81
50,60
1980s
36
26
1990s
Source: Based on data from Schaffer, 2004

The major categories for cost growth that were cited in the report are:
• Overly optimistic and unrealistic initial cost estimates,
• Project instability and funding issues,
• Problems with development of instruments and other spacecraft technology, and
• Launch service issues.
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Additionally, the report correlated data from fourteen NASA missions and developed
a relationship between cost and schedule growth that is described by the following
equation:
y=1.23x+0.13

R2=0.63

y is predicted schedule growth, x is the expected cost growth predicted, and R2 is the
coefficient of determination, which is the proportion of variability in a data set that is
accounted for by a statistical model. This is a good initial correlation that could be used
for the future project and its accuracy.
Furthermore, Bruno & et al. reported the following from a 2006 study:
•

Cost history data for 21 of the 24 projects studied shows cost growth.

•

Total growth from Phase B start to Estimate-to-Complete (ETC) at launch for all
projects studied represents a combined impact of $2 billion to the Science Mission
Directorate's (SMD) mission portfolio.

•

Schedule history data indicates schedule slips for 19 of the 24 projects studied.

•

15 of the projects show a substantially increased rate of internal cost growth after
Critical Design Review (CDR).

•

Correlations between cost performance

and development reserves, cost

performance and Phase B spending, or cost performance and the percent of funds
spent up to the CDR could not be found.
•

Although adequate Phase B funding is a necessary condition for project success, it
is not sufficient to ensure good overall cost performance.
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These results are very similar to other early NASA studies and it confirmed that NASA
needs to start looking at the problem from a different perspective. The report provided
three significant recommendations:
(1) SMD should provide a stable external environment of fixed requirements,
funding, and launch services;
(2) should require projects to improve the quality of early baseline cost and
schedule estimates, to include a complete and explainable basis of the estimates (BOE)
with corresponding cost and schedule detail, and include a level of reserves, determined
by the projects that is commensurate with the implementation risk; and
(3) should consider minimizing or eliminating blanket reserve level requirements.
Furthermore, Butts and Linton (2009) have compiled a historical evaluation of cost
and schedule estimating performance and introduced the Joint Confident LevelProbabilistic Calculator (JCL-PC). They claimed the JCL-PC corrects the overly
optimistic cost and schedule estimates and effectively compensates for the unidentified
risk events. They also referenced ninety-six historical projects that have an average cost
growth of 93%, and a median growth of 51%. Finally, they provided nine
recommendations: 1) include all risks in the JCL analysis; 2) mandate precise criteria for
the JCL; 3) require all estimates to be created by a bonafide group, like the SRB; 4)
recognize that cost control is important; 5) require managers to identify all elements that
cause funding distress; 6) require cost estimate to be submitted in future year dollars; 7)
require a more specific developmental stage of program; 8) disenfranchise the risk reward
system; and 9) remove the prevailing stigma that under-runs are unacceptable.

25

Additionally, they have compiled 188 projects' cost and schedule growth dataset, see
Appendix H.
NASA is not alone in a government that has program cost growth. The DOD's major
space acquisitions increased approximately $12.2 billion, with 44% from fiscal year 2006
through fiscal year 2011. The GAO stated that the DOD needs to take more action to
address unrealistic initial cost estimates of space systems (GAO-07-96). Moreover, in the
Navy Shipbuilding programs, the Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) criticized the
shipbuilder's estimating system, specifically for material and subcontract cost.
The RAND's Report (2006) stated, in light of cost growth, DOD senior leaders in the
Air Force want to generate better cost estimates that provide decision-makers with a
better sense of the risk involved in the cost estimates they receive. The Air Force Cost
Analysis Agency and the Air Force cost analysis community want to formulate and
implement a cost uncertainty analysis policy. The report defined that cost uncertainty
analysis is an important aspect of cost estimating and benefits decision-making. It helps
decision-makers understand not only the potential funding exposure, but also the nature
of risks for a particular program. The report emphasized the cost estimating methods;
such as Monte Carlo, expert judgment, historical analysis, and sensitivity analysis.
Finally, the report provided recommendations for a cost risk analysis policy for the DOD
programs. This report is relevant to the current study because it provides a complete
summary of cost estimating methods that are used in the DOD and could be used to
mitigate NASA's similar causes of cost growth. Additionally, the cost estimating policy
that the report provided could be implemented at NASA in some versions. Finally, this
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report confirmed that cost growth of programs is not NASA's unique problem, but that
DOD has similar issues and concerns.
2.3 Current Practice
In the 2008 NASA Cost Estimating Handbook (CEH), the Cost Risk chapter states
that NASA is embracing cost risk assessment to improve its reputation with external
stakeholders to deliver projects on time and within budget. NASA management believes
that all projects should submit budgets that are based on a quantification of all the risks
that could cause the project to take longer or cost more than initially anticipated.
Additionally, NASA has updated its policy to do a better job estimating project cost and
Program Managers must request budget amounts that reflect a 70% probability that the
project will be completed at or below this amount. NASA management recognizes it will
take time to fully implement this policy and has created an interim approach for the FY
2009 guidance. Moreover, NASA has acted on the findings of the 2004 GAO Report and
the Space Systems Development Growth Analysis report. The NASA cost estimating
community is resolved to forecast cost more accurately and to account for risk. Appendix
B contains the NASA Cost Risk Policy as excerpted from the CEH. The CEH reviews
new measures NASA is implementing to strengthen its attention to cost risk, including:
•

Distinguishing between uncertainty (lack of knowledge or decisions regarding
program definition or content) and risk (the probability of a predicted event
occurring and its likely effect or impact on the program).

•

Identifying the level of uncertainty inherent in the estimate by conducting a cost
risk assessment.

•

Pushing for greater front-end definition to minimize uncertainty.
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•

Resisting the urge to hide or carry uncertainty forward under cost estimating
assumptions.

Moreover, NASA must be able "to deliver its P/p on time and within the estimated
budgeted resources," as stated by Michael Griffin, the former NASA administrator. To
accomplish this objective, the NASA Administrator, through a series of Strategic
Management Council meetings, decided that all projects should be budgeted at a 70% CL
based on the independent cost estimate (ICE), which can be funded by either the project,
Mission Directorate, or performed by NASA's IPAO. This is one of the most important
ways that NASA can improve the quality of its cost estimates and, hence, its reputation
with its external stakeholders (see Appendix B). Additionally, NASA has twelve tenets of
cost risk (Appendix D) that are developed based on the project risk probability
distributions.
As seen from the above reviews, NASA must meet both stakeholder expectations and
its own policy. Better cost estimating will enhance these expectations and allow the
Program Manager, Project Manager, and the projects to better communicate the
program's cost need. Cost estimates predict future programs' cost and there is uncertainty
associated with them.
Thus, uncertainty analysis should be performed to capture the program risks. NASA
has been using available uncertainty factors from Aerospace, Air Force, and Booz Allen
Hamilton (BAH) to develop projects' risk posture (Appendix F). NASA has no insight
into the development of these factors, which can lead to unrealistic risks in many NASA
projects.
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From the literature, there is not a clear method of addressing the NUFs from historical
data to assess risk of project. Thus, the development of NASA-specific uncertainty
factors will provide a better cost estimate to the new P/p and move this field forward to a
more realistic cost prediction.
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CHAPTER 3
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The purpose of this chapter is to describe the basic knowledge required to collect and
analyze cost data. This chapter will cover several areas of data collection methodology,
data synthesizing, and data analysis. This project used programmatic methodology to
address its process, which includes collecting data from different sources, evaluating by
qualitatively and quantitatively logical processes and then developing NUFs, which can
be generalized to future NASA projects.
3.1 Data Collection
The question of cost data availability and relevance merits requires more discussion.
Most methods of assessing cost risk require some historical data, at levels of aggregation
that vary widely across the different methods. To set the context regarding the magnitude
of cost growth and using cost growth as a proxy for cost risk, the NASA historical
experience of cost growth on fifty missions will be explored. This study of cost growth is
difficult because of a method for recording project cost, technical issues, and schedule
data must be developed and implemented. These data are not recorded in a standardized
format and collected at a reasonable frequency. The depth at which the data are collected
is not dependent on the maturity of the project. The data is not consistent across the life
of the project so that, at project end, analysts can evaluate the data across the years
without ambiguity.
The goal of this project is to use historical NASA cost growth to develop NUF in
estimating risk during projects' initial phases of development. NASA has a vast of
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sources that house cost information. Over the years, NASA has developed a database to
document the cost of its missions. Using these data, with other supplementary
information, this project examined cost growth history to understand the cost growth data
distribution and to develop specific NASA uncertainty factors. This project has acquired
the data from three different sources:
a.

NASA Fiscal Year Budget Estimates:
One source of information for the basis for cost growth is the NASA Fiscal Year

Budget Estimates. These documents are publicly released in February of each year and
display the cost and major milestones of NASA's major programs. Other researchers
have acquired and collected data on NASA Earth and Space missions to address different
goals. Bitten et al., Smart, and Butts' papers have all investigated recent NASA cost and
schedule growth history for science missions. These missions included both Space and
Earth Science missions, Aeronautics, Space Operational missions, and other Programs.
An examination of this historical data has shown that such space projects often
experience higher costs relative to initial estimates and project plans. For this study,
Freaner's data was investigated and categorized to develop the NASA uncertainty factors.
Thus, this project used data for forty NASA missions as the basis for the cost growth that
was collected by Freaner's team. These missions are shown in Table 2.

b.

Cost Analysis Data Requirement (CADRe):
It has been difficult to obtain technical and cost information on NASA space flight

systems. Once a mission was launched, personnel were reassigned and development data
was lost or thrown away. In December of 2003, NASA initiated a document action
process that would capture technical and cost information regarding NASA missions at
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various points during the life of the mission. This document was called the CADRe and
was incorporated into the NPR 7120.5 series NASA Space Flight Program and Project
Management Requirements. The CADRe data constitutes one of the better ways to track
cost estimates and schedules for major NASA missions. Over the past several years,
NASA has collected and organized cost data from project managers, the budget office,
and mission directorates as a basis for complete project data. Much of the data for this
project was obtained from the CADRe that NASA has prepared on each of the missions
studied. For this project, ten other completed missions have been added to the data. Thus,
this project will investigate fifty completed missions and ten still active projects'
missions (see Table 2).
c.

GAO Reports:
Several science active missions are included in this study, which were obtained from

GAO reports and cost analysts from NASA. The GAO report of 2011 has stated that there
are 21 NASA projects with a combined life-cycle cost that exceeds $68 billion. This
report has been used to verify some of the active missions' data used in this investigation.
Table 2 provides the data used in this project, which are of two types: completed missions
and active missions. The active missions are considered an estimate of cost growth.
Figure 8 summarizes the collection procedure from the three sources and
demonstrates that data was verified several times to ensure accuracy of the result, which
created a NASA data set to be evaluated for this project.
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Figure 8. Project Data Collection Procedure

3.2 Data Management
The data for this research project has been managed as described in the flowchart
found in Figure 9. Sixty missions were collected for this project; and thirty nine were
used to develop the NASA uncertainty factors. Five completed missions were used to test
the results.
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3.3 Project Data Analysis
Table 2 has the summary of the investigated missions for this project.

Table 2. Summary of Missions Investigated

NEAR
LUNAR PROSPECTOR
GENESIS
MESSENGER
MARS PATHFINDER
STARDUST
CONTOUR
DEEP
IMPACT MGS
MCO/MPL

MER
MRO
FAST
SWAS
TRACE
WIRE
ACE
FUSE
IMAGE
MAP

Completed Missions
EOS-Aqua
HESSI
EOS-Aura
GALEX
LANDSAT-7
SWIFT
TRMM
GRACE
CLOUDSAT TIMED
CALIPSO
GRAVITY PROBE B
THEMIS
DS-1
HETE-II
EO-1
SORCE
SIRTF
STEREO
ICESAT

Active Missions
AIM
DAWN
PHOENIX
GLAST
KEPLER
SDO
WISE
NEW HORIZONS
LRO
OCO

JUNO
AQUARIUS
LDCM
NPP
GPM
MMS
JWST
MSL
RBSP
GRAIL
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For this investigation, the development cost is defined as the Phases B-D and does not
include the launch vehicle cost or operational cost. Figure 10 shows the NASA phases of
the development from the start of Phase B to the end of Phase D.

Figure 10. NASA's Life-Cycle Reviews for Flight Projects (NASA NPR 7120.5)

Figure 11 displays two important factors: initial/final cost and the percentage of cost
growth. The percentage of cost growth of the mission dataset is shown in Figure 11 by
the line chart on the secondary y-axis. For comparison purposes, the development initial
cost is compared with actual cost from the start of Phase B to the end of Phase D. In this
chart, the mean of the fifty completed missions' development cost growth is
approximately 30%.
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Figure 11. Initial and Final Cost for 50 Completed Projects including Cost Growth
Percentage

Additionally, ten activity missions have been studied in this investigation and have
seen cost growth in the cost estimating already from PDR to CDR, or SIR, as shown in
Figure 10. There are two other missions, Mars Science Laboratory and James Webb
Space Telescope, which were considered for the study, but their cost growth is 114% and
240%, respectively. These two missions are very complex and have a greater funding
profile than most NASA science missions. Several runs were conducted including these
two missions; however, the purpose of Figure 12 is to share the other missions' cost
growths and ensure they are noticeable.
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Figure 12. Initial and Current Cost for 9 Active Projects

3.4 NASA Data Analysis
To be able to understand the collected data, one must analyze the data in different
ways to get more insight and understanding. One method is to use the historical cost
growth as a proxy for the cost uncertainty. This method provides not only the average
cost growth for past estimates, but also variability in that growth risk. Figure 13 displays
the percentage of cost growth and the number of completed missions in the histogram
chart. This chart shows that the data distribution is a bi-modal pattern. Most of the
mission has expected cost growth of 10-30%, and more risky missions can have cost
growth of more than 100%, such as MSL and JWST.
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Figure 13. Percentage of Cost Growth 50 Completed Missions

When adding the ten active missions, the pattern did not change and the bi-modal
trend was noted. Figure 14 shows sixty investigated missions that have cost growth and
have a very similar pattern to the fifty missions. Actually, the greater than 100% active
missions have increased by 3 times as the completed missions. This indicates that the
active missions have a higher cost growth than completed missions.
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Figure 14. Percentage of Cost Growth for 60 Missions

In 2003, McCrillis developed Figure 15 from the DOD's 142 systems data entitled,
"Cost Growth of Major Defense Programs." This distribution is very similar to the NASA
sixty missions shown in Figure 14. The similarity contributed to the high risk and
uniqueness of these two agencies. Additionally, it shows that smaller-sized projects tend
to have much greater uncertainty in the initial estimates and are the source of the largest
magnitude cost growth. Moreover, larger-sized projects tend to experience more
reasonable cost growth, although 100% cost growth is not unexpected.
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Figure 15. DOD Cost Growth Distributions for 142 Systems (McCrillis, 2003)

Bearden (2000) stated that each bar's height represents the percentage difference
between a satellite's estimated cost and its actual cost in Figure 16. It has the same profile
as shown in Figure 14 and Figure 15, which is the bi-modal distribution of the cost
growth from multiple sources. Bearden explained that a cost-percentage comparison that
makes use of an older model and the updated dollars-per-kilogram relationships are used
to estimate modern small-satellite costs.
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Figure 16. SmaU Satellite Cost Study (Bearden, 2000)

Moreover, NASA historical data showed that most of the mission's cost growth lies
between 10-30% of its initial cost planned. Figure 17 shows the range from -20% up to
450% cost growth, which is based on what information was included in the data set. For
this project, further analysis of the cost growth data indicated that the average total cost
growth for completed missions was 30% during only the development phase of the
project.
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Figure 17. NASA 60 Historical Missions Cost Growth

There are a significant number of missions that experienced cost growth. What are the
main causes of the growth? One can understand that space businesses are complicated,
challenging, and one-of-kind. The space industry has been building space-based
instruments and spacecraft for over 40 years. Experience, lessons learned, and realistic
planning should reduce the cost growth. Most of the cost growth is classified as related to
instrument technical development challenges, spacecraft technical problems, due to test
failures, due to overly optimistic heritage assumptions, and due to management problems.
A snapshot of the causes of these missions' cost growth is summarized in Table 3. The
most commonly identified factors, which have been cited by other formal studies are the
following:
Overly optimistic and unrealistic initial cost estimates,
•

Project instability and funding issues,
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Technology level readiness,
Assessment of heritage,
Problems with development of instruments and other spacecraft technology, and
•

Launch service issues.

Table 3. Cost Growth Reasons for NASA Selected Missions
Mission

% Cost
Growth

Reason for Cost Growth

ACE

-21.4% No major programmatic or technical delays

NEAR

-16.8% No major programmatic or technical delays

MGS

-6.8% No major programmatic or technical delays

EOS-Aqua

-6.6% Launch delay & delayed observatory I&T

TRMM

-2.8% Launch delay due to Japanese H-II launch vehicle problems

Stardust
Mars
Pathfinder
Lunar
Prospector
New
Horizons

-0.8% No major programmatic or technical delays

MCO/MPL
THEMIS

0.0% No major programmatic or technical delays
1.0% Launch delay due to Athena launch vehicle and conflict with Cassini
launch
1.2% Design stability issue
3.3% Severe programmatic cost and schedule pressure lead to failure of
both spacecraft
5.2% Problems with main contractor lead to cost growth

IMAGE

6.7% Technical problems due to electronic parts and problems with thermal
blanketing
6.7% Launch delay

LRO

7.6% Heritage complexity, thermal environment and launch delay

EOS-Aura
WISE

8.1% Instrument deliveries delayed due to technical problems

MAP

FUSE

8.2% Design stability, Structural model failure during vibration testing
9.4% Problems with Fine Guidance Sensor lead to delay

SORCE

9.6% Delays in bus and instrument deliveries

GRACE

11.5% Problems with instrument development led to delays

DS-1

12.6% Technical problems with introducing new technologies

TRACE

13.2% Difficulties with instrument development

MRO

14.1% Problems uncovered during environmental testing

Landsat-7

16.0% Instrument deliveries delayed due to technical problems
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% Cost
Mission

Growth

Reason for Cost Growth

MER

16.1% Resolving mass & schedule problems

Genesis

18.5%

FAST

18.9% Launch vehicle delay caused by Pegasus failure

SDO
OCO

21.6% Complexity of heritage technology, contractor performance, and
funding issues
22.7% Design stability and contractor performance

Contour

24.3%

Spacecraft subsystem late delivery then launch delay

Technical and staffing problems at APL

Launch slip due to technical problems encountered by the Jason 1
spacecraft
25.8% Technical problems, launch date, contractor performance, heritage
complexity
27.7% Difficulties with instrument development
25.6%

TIMED
DAWN
WIRE

Deep Impact

Substantial problems with instrument development & contractor
performance
30.0% Technical and management problems at Ball

STEREO

31.3% Problems with instrument growth & staffing

SIRTF

Substantial problems with instrument development and software on
spacecraft
40.8% Difficulties with instrument development

29.5%
Kepler

36.3%

AIM
Gravity
Probe B
Phoenix

42.4% Cost growth due to various unanticipated technical challenges, late
delivery of payload.
43.2% Technical Problems

HESSI

45.6% Test equipment failure and launch delay due to Pegasus

ICESAT

45.9%

Significant delays in GLAS instrument development

Messenger

51.0%

Late delivery of instruments and integration problems

GALEX

57.9%

Severe problems with telescope and spacecraft

GLAST

59.3%

Design stability and complexity of heritage technology

SWIFT

61.0% Problems developing BAT instrument

SWAS
HETE-II
CLOUDSAT
EO-1

66.8% Launch vehicle delay caused by Pegasus failure - Spacecraft went
into storage
71.4% Problems requiring additional testing and delays with Pegasus Launch
Vehicle
79.6% Problems with High Voltage Power Supply combined with Launch
Vehicle Delay
114.2% Technical Problem, adding Hyperion instrument and launch delay
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% Cost
Mission
CALIPSO
MMS
GRAIL

Growth

Reason for Cost Growth

149.7% Problems with LIDAR instruments combined with Launch Vehicle
Delay
3.3% Technology maturity and partner performance
1.2%

Heritage complexity and launch manifest

LDCM

15.4% Technology maturity and partner performance

GLORY

17.8% Technology maturity, contractor performance and design stability

JUNO

20.0% Design stability and development partner performance

GPM

22.3% Technology maturity, and funding issues

AQUARIUS

25.7% Design stability and partner performance

NPP

50.0% Technology maturity and design stability

MSL

114.3% Technology maturity and design stability

JWST

242.3% Complexity of heritage technology and funding issues

Average

30.8% Most of the last Ten missions are in CDR or SIR

3.5 Non-NASA Uncertainty Factors
NASA has historically underestimated and underfunded the cost of new missions. In
the NASA environment, cost data is limited and accurate cost estimating is a significant
challenge, as stated previously. Given this environment of limited data and substantial
uncertainty associated with predicting the future, for best decision support, it is
imperative that analysts quantify the confidence or uncertainty of their estimates. Cost
analysts try to develop the best cost estimates possible from the available information.
The most common approach is to develop a "most likely", "optimistic", and "pessimistic"
estimate for each component in the mission. Because every assumption that drives a cost
estimate represents a point within a range of possible values, an estimate of this type is
called the "point estimate," which carries specific risk within. No matter how much effort
is applied to the lower elements in the estimate, total levels in the point estimate do not
reflect a "most likely" value in most cases.
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Uncertainty occurs for a number of reasons. The objective of the cost uncertainty
analysis is to estimate the uncertainty of the point estimate and provide a basis for
assessing its uncertainty or variability for a specific estimate. Because the point estimate
is based on assumptions with associated uncertainty, the analyst must consider risk and
uncertainty from the very outset of the project or estimate. Uncertainty is sometimes
expressed as a probability distribution of outcomes; the greater the width of the
distribution, the more uncertain the outcome. Uncertainty factors play an important role
in cost estimation because the amount of uncertainty around an estimate is information
that helps the decision-maker.
Additionally, risk analysis is an important component of a decision-making process.
It allows decision-makers to get a better understanding of the range of possible outcomes
of any decision—in other words, how good or bad the outcome might be and how
uncertain the outcome is. Risk analysis also helps the decision-making process by
identifying known risk areas. In some cases, such information can be used to mitigate
areas that are high risk. Risk analysis brings more information which, in turn, generates
more realistic expectations.
Uncertainty in cost estimating creates concern. Uncertainty of an estimate is tied to a
risk: the more uncertain the estimate, the greater the chance of an adverse or unexpected
outcome. Uncertainty of an estimate can reflect both financial risk and operational risk to
the Agency, which can damage its image and reputation. Thus, to characterize cost
uncertainty is to characterize cost risk. Understanding cost risk is an important
component of decision-making. Decision-makers seek to understand the risks they
assume with any type of investment or program. Greater cost risk might require increased
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management oversight to reduce or mitigate the risks identified, or to provide more
reserve funds.
NASA cost analysts are using three different types of uncertainty factors that were
developed by:
1. The United States Air Force,
2. The Aerospace Corporation, and
3. Booz Allen Hamilton (BAH).

NASA has no insight into the methodology and the data that developed these factors;
and they do not represent NASA missions. Table 4, Table 5, and Table 6 display the Air
Force, Aerospace Corporation, and BAH uncertainty factors, respectively.

The

Aerospace UFs are obtained from the 2010 Aerospace Study of twenty SMD projects.
BAH UFs are obtained from a study that BAH performed; this information was
proprietary. These factors have been used for several NASA missions, such as MMS and
LDCM. Finally, the Air Force has been used in several NASA missions such as Global
Precipitation Measurement (GPM) and Radiation Belt Storm Probe (RBSP).
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Table 4. Air Force Uncertainty Factors
Optimistic

Level

Most Likely

Pessimistic

Low

0,95

1.1

Low Plus

0.96

1.23

Modefite

0.97

1.36

Moderate Plus

0.98

1.49

High

0.98

1.61

High Plus

0.99

1.74

Very High

1

Very High Plus

1

1

•

1.87
2

Table 5. Aerospace Corporation Uncertainty Factors
Lcvd

Low 10<Vo

Mid 50»/o

Hlfih90°/o

SEE

Low

0.97"

1.117

0.0!

Medium Low

0.932

1.3!

0.1!

Vietnam

0.887

1.583

0.2!

Medium High

0.842

1.816

0.3!

llleh

0.,'97

2.05

0.4!

liehi

0.-752

2.5

V'mlDeh

0.-»07

3

Venrhleb»

0.6«2

4.*

Extra high

0.617

C
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Table 6. Booz Allen Hamilton (BAH) Uncertainty Factors
Current Baseline S c h e d u l e
Aggressive
M o s t Likely C o n s e r v a t i v e
Complexity
N(0.8, .05)
N(1.20, .05)
N(1.00, .05)
Very Low
N(0.8, .15)
N(1.20, .15)
N(1.00, .15)
Low
N(1.O0, .25)
N(0.8, .25)
N(1.20, .25)
Moderate
N(1.O0,
.35)
N(0.8, .35)
N(1.20,
.35)
High
NfO.8. .45)
NI1.20. .451
NM.OO. .451
VervHiah
Conservative
Optimistic

Aggressive Assumptions
-Used conservative of 0 8 and added 1 sigina
Pessimistic -Used pessimistic of 1 2 and added 2 Sigma

Most Likely

Very low

0.850

1

1.30C

Low

0.950

1

1.50(1

VIoderate

1.050

1

l.^OC

High

1.150

1

1.9O0

Very High

1-250

1

2.100

As noted above, this lack of information about the methods used to develop these
factors introduced skepticism. These factors have been tested in the NASA historical
completed missions in the middle range only, as shown in the yellow highlighted rows.
The approach is known as the 3-point range. This approach is currently being used by
NASA to report project cost estimates. In fact, factors are called an estimate in terms of
high, mid, and low points and may in fact be easier for the experts to provide rather than
identifying a specific value. Figure 18a displays an example of cost risk using the 3-point
range method. Each point -optimistic, most likely, and pessimistic-represents an
estimate with a different set of assumptions (see Figure 18b). These assumptions can
directly reflect the project's specific technical and programmatic risks. These points are
the possibility of showing a 3-point range determined by a probabilistic assessment.
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MostLikdy Estimate
S425M

Optimistic- Low Estimate
$280M

1

I

$200M

$400M

S300M

Pessimistic - Hisji Estimate
$?S0M

1

$?O0M

$600M

Figure 18a. A Prototype of 3-Point Range Estimate

Optimistic

'Best-Estimate<Mode)

Pessimistic- Technical &Prog-ammatic
Challenges

Figure 18b. Another Diagram to Demonstrate 3-Point Range Estimate

For the purposes of this project, three risk levels have been selected to test: moderate,
high, and high plus. Additionally, the data was tested and analyzed for optimistic and
pessimistic cases only. These cases are shown in Table 7.
Table 7. Selected Uncertainty Factors for Three Risk Levels

Level of Risk

BAH Uncertainty Factors Selected
Optimistic

Most Likely

Pessimistic

Moderate

1.050

1

1.700

High

1.150

1

1.900

Very High

1.250

1

2.100

Air Force Uncertainty Factors Selected
Moderate Plus

0.98

1

1.49

High

0.98

1

1.61

50

High Plus

0.99

1

1.74

Aerospace Uncertainty Factors Selected
Medium High

0.842

1

1.816

High

0.797

1

2.05

high+

0.752

1

2.5

The NASA data collected for cost risk analysis will be used to empirically validate
three uncertainty factors and their associated level of risk analyses. Such a validation
would help to improve both the understanding of the given uncertainty values and quality
of these factors in the estimation of NASA cost risk process. It is vital to the credibility of
both cost estimates and cost risk analyses to demonstrate how well they have predicted
NASA mission cost. Figure 19 displays the NASA historical data using the Air Force
uncertainty factors for optimistic and pessimistic. Using the Air Force optimistic
uncertainty factors does not provide the correct prediction of NASA missions as seen in
the figure. Keep in mind that the initial cost is often budget-driven. For example, for the
AO missions, the initial "cost" is really the "budget" that the project has been given. For
the optimistic case, these factors missed the actual final NASA cost of almost 90% of the
missions, but for the pessimistic case, they overestimated all NASA missions.
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Figure 19. Air Force Optimistic & Pessimistic Uncertainty Factors & NASA
Historical Missions Data

Figure 20 displays the NASA history data and applies the Aerospace uncertainty
factors for optimistic and pessimistic. As seen from the figure, these factors do not come
close to the actual NASA data. Thus, they are not valid factors to use to predict cost
estimation of NASA missions. As seen in Figure 20, the optimistic case, it was
underestimating NASA data and, for the pessimistic case, these factors predicted a much
higher estimate than the actual NASA cost.
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Figure 20. Aerospace Optimistic & Pessimistic Uncertainty Factors & NASA
Historical Missions Data

Figure 21 displays the NASA history data and applies the BAH optimistic and
pessimistic uncertainty factors for optimistic and pessimistic. As seen from the figure,
these factors do not come close to the actual NASA data. Similar observations have been
noticed for the BAH factors. For the pessimistic case, they overestimated the NASA cost
growth missions, but the optimistic was close to the actual, except for a few missions.
The high risk factors do not estimate or predict NASA actual cost estimation.
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Figure 21. Booz Allen Hamilton Optimistic & Pessimistic Uncertainty Factors &
NASA Historical Missions Data

Thus, the above figures demonstrate that the Air Force, Aerospace and BAH
uncertainty factors are not the best tools to use to estimate or predict NASA missions'
cost risks. It seems clear that no one uncertainty factor can predict the NASA missions
and assess cost risk in projects. To have a useful and credible cost risk analysis,
uncertainty factors must be used which fit the level of detail required and the resources
available for NASA projects. Thus, NASA historical data will be of great value in
developing actual NUFs.
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3.6 Understanding the NASA Patterns
Traditionally, cost uncertainty is communicated through probability distributions, the
results of a Monte Carlo simulation that are presented through a probable density
function (PDF) or a cumulative distribution function (CDF). These methods provide the
decision-maker with the probability distribution of the confidence of an estimate. Often,
decision-makers are not trained or current in probability methods; thus, their
understanding of the implied cost uncertainty may be limited.
NASA historical data for the sixty missions were analyzed in different matters to
understand the pattern of cost growth. Figure 22 shows how most of the projects have
cost growth in a range from 30-36%. Additionally, the data was sorted by chronological
order to provide any indication of whether NASA is improving in cost estimating.
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Figure 22. 60 NASA Historical Data including Initial and Actual Cost
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Further analysis has been conducted to group the missions and to understand the data.
Figure 23 shows four different binnings of the cost growth of NASA missions. It seems
that most of the cost growth occurs between 10-30%. Over 50% of the data fall in that
range, thus placing the data into bins helps the analysis and provides a manageable group
data.
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Figure 23. NASA Historical Cost Data with Size of Growth Binning

It has been selected 10% binning of the data to develop a distribution fit to the
collected cost growth for fifty completed missions and ten active missions. Additionally,
the collected data that is higher than 70% cost growth is grouped as one for ease of
analysis (Figure 23).
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3.7 Development of Distribution
This section addresses the development of a specific distribution from the NASA
sixty missions cost growth data. There is a large number of possible distribution shapes
defined in the literature, which are available through a variety of tools. In an effort to
ensure the quality of the result, several distributions defined in Table 8 have been tested.
Additionally, several software tools have been evaluated to conduct this task: Table
Curve 2D, EasyFit, and Peak Fit. EasyFit was the selected software to analyze NASA
data due to the fact that it was compatible with Microsoft® Excel, which is the software
chosen to store the data. Additionally, EasyFit software is striving for a good balance
between the accuracy and speed of calculations. It uses the Method of Moments (MOM)
and the Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE). Moreover, it is a part of the MathWave
data analysis and simulation software that has been in use for decades. Schittkowski
(1998) has developed a paper explaining the EasyFit software system for data fitting in
dynamic systems.
Project cost is an uncertain quantity and probability distributions are used. Triangular,
Beta, Lognormal, and Normal are probability distributions commonly used in cost
estimating uncertainty analysis. Figure 24 graphically demonstrates that point estimates
of individual elements using the triangular and normal distributions can be quantified as
most-likely, median, mean, and mode. Perlstein, Jarvis, and Muzzuchi (2001) discuss the
use of the beta distribution for quantifying cost uncertainty.
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Median 17 75

Mean, Median, Mode = 15

Mode 15.00
Mean 18.33

Figure 24. Statistics of the Triangular and Normal Distributions (NASA CEH, 2008)

It is important to understand that the actual cost of a project is the cumulative effect
of small influences. When these influences are additive, use of the normal distribution is
justified by the Central Limit Theorem (CLT). The CLT states that "the average of the
sum of a large number of independent, identically distributed random variables with
finite means and variances converges "in distribution" to a normal random variable" (see
Figure 25). When the influences are multiplicative, use of the lognormal distribution is
justified. In general, costs tend to accrue in a multiplicative sort of way, for example,
wage rate multiplied by headcount. In this investigation, the normal, lognormal and other
distributions commonly used in cost estimating uncertainty analysis were tested as bestfits for observed cost growth on many NASA projects. A list of most common probability
used in cost estimating uncertainty analysis (shown in Table 8 from the GAO 09-3SP
report) was evaluated.

58

WBS Element Triangular
Cost Distributions

Merge WBS Element Cost Distributions
into Total Cost Normal Distribution

Most Likely

Most Likely
Total Cost
Roll Up of Most
Likely WBS
Element Costs

Most Likely

Most Likely

Figure 25. Central Limit Theorem (NASA CEH, 2008)

59
Table 8. Common ProbabiUty Distributions (GAO 09-3SP Report, 2009)
Distribution
Bernoulli

Description
Assigns probabilities of "p" for
success and "1 - p* for failure;
mean = *p*; variance = "1 - p*

Beta

Similar to normal distribution
but does not allow for negative
cost or duration, this continuous
distribution can be symmetric or
skewed

Lognormal

Normal

Poisson

A continuous distribution
positively skewed with a
limitless upper bound and
known lower bound; skewed to
the right to reflect the tendency
toward higher cost
Used for outcomes likely to
occur on either side of the
average value; symmetric
and continuous, allowing for
negative costs and durations.
In a normal distribution, about
68% of the values fall within one
standard deviation of the mean
Peaks early and has a long tail
compared to other distributions

Typical application

Shape

With likelihood and consequence
risk cube models; good for
representing the probability of a
risk occurring but not for the impact
on the program

ProbabMy

Probal*y

To capture outcomes biased toward
the tail ends of a range; often used
with engineering data or analogy
estimates; the shape parameters
usually cannot be collected from
interviewees

«j,

To characterize uncertainty
in nonlinear cost estimating
relationships; it is important to
know how to scale the standard
deviation, which is needed for this
distribution

Probab*ty

Probability

To assess uncertainty with cost
estimating methods; standard
deviation or standard error of the
estimate is used to determine
dispersion. Since data must be
symmetrical, it is not as useful
for definingrisk,which is usually
asymmetrical, but can be useful for
scaling estimating error

^

probabmty

To predict all kinds of outcomes, like
the number of software defects or
test failures
VSues

Triangular

Uniform

Characterized by three points
(most likely, pessimistic, and
optimistic values), can be
skewed or symmetric and is
easy to understand because it
is intuitive; one drawback is the
absoluteness of the end points,
although this is not a limitation
in practice since it is used in a
simulation
Has no peaks because all values,
including highest and lowest
possible values, are equally likely

Probably

^
/

To express technical uncertainty,
because it works for any system
architecture or design; also used to
determine schedule uncertainty

Values

With engineering data or analogy
estimates

Probabtty

Values

Weibull

Versatile, can take on the
characteristics of other
distributions, based on the value
of the shape parameter "b"—
e.g., Rayteigh and exponential
distributions can be derived
from it"

Probability

In life data and reliability analysis
because it can mimic other
distributions and its objective
relationship to reliability modeling
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The most popular distribution shapes tested in this investigation with sixty NASA
missions' data include: lognormal, log logistic, Weibull, Normal, Beta, Burr, and general
extreme value. Figure 26 displays the sixty missions as functions of cost growth
percentage plotting with PDF and the probability-probability (P-P) plot. The P-P plot is a
graph of the empirical CDF values plotted against the theoretical CDF values. It is used
to determine how well a specific distribution fits to the observed data. This plot will be
approximately linear if the specified theoretical distribution is the correct model. These
plots are used as visual and qualitative assessments.

W a o w f t ttmrmof

&•*> t>U* ! » NASA

Figure 26. Probability Density Function & Probability-Probability Plot for 60
NASA Missions
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Figure 26 shows that Beta, Burr, Log-Logistic and lognormal distributions fit the data
well. Table 9 displays the summary of the distribution parameters.

Table 9. 60 Missions Data Fits
Distribution
Beta
Burr(4P)
3en. Extreme Value

Parameters
xi=0.54859 oc2=4.1218
i=-21.0 b=444.0
<=0.42648 a=5.87
3=49.091 T=-42.854
c=0.37931 CT=20.12 u=12.455

[nv. Gaussian (3 P)
Log-Logistic (3P)

>,=128.48 U=66.62 y=-30.636
2=2.8108 p=46.552 ^-26.488

Lognormal(3P)
Normal

7=0.66093 u=3.9014 y=-28.101
7=67.06 u=35.984

Pearson 6 (4P)

*i=878.35 a2=4.143
3=0.25804 y=-38.756

Weibull (3P)

1=1.1225 p=59.975

Y=-21.142

Several tests from the EasyFit software test the quality of the fit of two tests: the
Kolmogorov-test and the Anderson-Darling test. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic (D)
is based on the largest vertical difference between the theoretical and the empirical
cumulative distribution function. The Anderson-Darling procedure is a general test to
compare the fit of an observed cumulative distribution function to an expected
cumulative distribution function. This test gives more weight to the tails than the
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test. Appendix G has the summary for all the cases that have been
tested for this project.
Figure 27 shows the cost growth data for only fifty-four NASA missions, which do
not include under cost missions. Table 10 displays the result of the distribution fits.
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Figure 27. Probability Density Function & Probability-Probability Plot for 54
NASA Missions
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Table 10. Summary for the 54 Mission Quality of the Fit
Distribution
Beta
3urr

Parameters
X!=0.3319 a2=2.789
i=-6.2932E-17 b=5.4851
c=1.5284 a=1.3144 3=0.34407
c=0.49034 a=0.15481 u=0.1848

3en. Extreme Value
[nv. Gaussian

K=0.15329 u=0.41833

Log-Logistic

x=1.4856 p=0.22092

Lognormal

j=1.238 n=-1.5616

Mormal

7=0.69109 u=0.41833

Pearson 6

xi=1.4119 a2=2.4747 P=0.43966

Weibull

1=0.84335 (3=0.38227

The data presented in the three tables above lead to narrowing the focus of Weibull
and lognormal distributions. Several other runs have been conducted to understand the
actual behavior of the data, as follows:
1. Delete two missions that are over 150% cost increase (see Figure 28). They may
be outlier missions within the data set. Outliers were checked by determining if
the fit got better by not including any one mission in the data set at a time.
2. Include only increase cost - Delete under-cost missions and two missions above
(see Figure 29).
3. Delete missions over 100% cost growth (see Figure 30).
4. Concentrate on the two distributions: lognormal and Weibull (see Figure 31).
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Figure 28. Probability Density Function & Probability-Probability Plot for 58
NASA Missions

Figure 29. ProbabiUty Density Function & ProbabiUty-Probability Plot for 52
NASA Missions
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Missions less 100% Cost Growth
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Numerous studies have empirically shown the lognormal and Weibull to be excellent
approximations to the overall distribution function of a mission's total cost, even in the
presence of correlations among cost element costs. The lognormal is similar to the
Weibull, but lognormal is different than the Weibull distribution because it is skewed
towards the positive end of the range and captures more of the initial missions in the
lower cost growth instead of being flat in the beginning of the distribution. The
lognormal distribution illustrates the distribution shape if the cost growth bounds are
taken as "10-30%," which seems normal for most missions (see Figure 32). The threeparameter lognormal distribution is:
a- continuous parameter(a>0)
u- continuous parameter
Y - continuous location parameter (y= 0 yields the two-parameter lognormal distribution)
Domain y <*< +oo
•

Probability Density Function
F(X)= exp (-1/2 (In (x- y ) - [i I o )2)/ (x- y) a (2n)m

•

Cumulative Distribution Function
F(x) = cp (In (x- y ) - u/ a)

q> is the Laplace Integral
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Figure 32. Probability Density Function & Probability-Probability Plot for 60
NASA Missions -Focus on Lognormal Distributions

Galton (1879) stated that the lognormal is used when considering the multiplication
or the geometric mean for independent random variables, and the CLT applies to their
logarithms. The lognormal distribution shape is selected distribution that is ultimately
modeled in the analysis and has the following property: mean of 3.03 and standard
deviation of 1.08. This distribution is based on the 44 completed missions with cost
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growth only. Thus, this lognormal distribution has been selected to describe the NASA
historical data distribution (see Figure 33):

F(X)=

V

° '

u= 3.03
o= 1.08
The parameters denoted fx and a are the mean and standard deviation, respectively, of
the variable's natural logarithm. Additionally, those parameters that can be converted to
normal /u and a, are the mean and standard deviation, respectively, then the values are:
JU=20.7

o= 2.91
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Figure 33. Probability Density Function for 44 NASA Missions -Focus on
Lognormal Distribution and its Property
Several runs have been conducted to test the robustness of the selected distribution.
Below are four lognormal distributions from three NASA cost data sets:
1. All data including MSL and JWST (A- Data), 54 missions (Figure 34).
2. All data excluding MSL and JWST (B- Data), 52 missions (Figure 35).
3. All completed missions (C-Data), 44 missions (Figure 33).
4. All data less than 100% cost growth (D- Data).
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Table 11. Four Lognormal Distributions Properties for NASA Data
Type of Data

a= Mean

% Error

H =Std. Dev.

% Error

A - Data

1.18

6

3.01

3.08

B-Data

1.11

2.78

2.92

3.63

C - Data

1.08

0.9

3.03

6.32

D-Data

1.07

2.85

Figure 34. Probability Density Function for 54 NASA Missions
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Figure 35. Probability Density Function for 52 NASA Missions

The lognormal distribution is the most suitable distribution that a cost estimator can
use to perform an uncertainty analysis for the NASA data (see Appendix H for lognormal
model). Lognormal distribution has a defined lower bound that is never less than zero and
an upper bound of infinity, which provides at least some probability of a large cost
overrun, as seen in several missions. It is sufficient and represents the characteristic of the
NASA historical data. Dataset C and Figure 33 are the recommended data to represent
NASA historical data and will be used to develop the NUFs.
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This chapter provides an overview of the development of the NUF and the validation
of these factors with NASA data. NUF begins with a general understanding of the
lognormal property, and then specifically addresses the factors with validation of several
missions.
4.1 Development of NASA Uncertainty Factors
One of the major considerations in cost estimating is how to assess and quantify
technical, cost, and schedule risks. Certainly, there are many complex methods and
formulas that do so, but these risks are ultimately subjective and judgmental in nature, no
matter how they are developed and applied. The intent of this project is to provide a
means and rationale for estimating mission risk using a common-sense, non-statistical
approach that generates results using historical data that correlate well with more
mathematically rigorous methods.
Uncertainty is expressed in a simulation by specifying the shape and bounds of the
uncertainty distribution for the cost methods and cost drivers (input variables) where the
value is not certain. Understanding the NASA data distribution could be used as a
lognormal distribution model from the previous chapter. Lognormal distributions have a
defined lower bound that is never less than zero. Lognormal does not permit a negative
tail and preserves the mean and standard deviation. They have an upper bound of infinity,
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thus providing at least some probability of a large cost overrun. The skew of a lognormal
is pre-defined.
The development of the uncertainty factors from NASA data will now be developed
and demonstrated. Graphing the lognormal distribution with NASA data in a Q-Q plot,
85% of data has shown falls in a normalized line in the 0-30% range. Figure 36 shows the
NASA data is mostly below 40% cost growth. Additionally, there are four data points
that cover missions with cost growth over 100% that do not lie within the Q-Q plot.
These missions are outside the normal NASA historical cost growth and could be
skewing the plot, but they needed to be included. The statistical analysis of the historical
data to derive the growth uncertainty factor is straightforward. It has the additional
advantage that it takes into account the trends in costs that are not explicitly used in the
historical analogy methodology.
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Figure 36. Q-Q Plot of the 54 NASA Missions - Focus on Lognormal Distribution

If one concentrates on the completed missions mentioned above, then focus on the
actual repeated cost growth can be recommended for more realistic uncertainty factors.
Figure 37 shows the Q-Q plot for a mission that has cost growth less than 100%. The
quantile-quantile (Q-Q) plot is a graph of the input (observed) data values plotted against
the theoretical (fitted) distribution quantiles. Both axes of this graph are in units of the
input data set. For this data set, the qualitative review suggests that the data is consistent
with the theoretical fit, except for the two data points with high cost growth.
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Figure 37. Q-Q Plot for 44 NASA Completed Missions

Table 12 provides the recommended NUF based on the historical data. This table
consists of four types of uncertainty factors: risk not adjusted, conservative, semiaggressive, and aggressive. These factors correspond to three levels of risk: moderate,
high, and very high. The moderate level of risk is defined as between 10-30% based on
the data. Additionally, a 30% limit is set because a report to Congress is necessary above
this level. The high and high plus risk are defined based on the complexity of the
missions and technology development. They range from 30-70% growth for high and
higher than 250% for very high.
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Table 112. Recommended NASA Uncertainty Factors (NUFs)
NASA Uncertainty Factors
Level of Risk
No- Risk Adjusted Conservative

Semi-Aggressive Aggressive

Moderate (10-30%)

1

1.1

1.2

1.3

High (30-75%)

1

1.3

1.5

1.75

Very High (>75%)

1

1.75

2.1

2.5

The justification for the uncertainty factors for each category is based on actual data
and from the developed distribution of lognormal. Most of the data are contained in the
range from conservative-to-aggressive for the moderate risk level from Table 12. NASA
missions, such as Lunar Reconnaissance Orbiter (LRO), Wide-Field Infrared Survey
Explorer (WISE), and Far Ultraviolet Spectroscopic Explorer (FUSE) are at a 10%
moderate level risk with conservative uncertainty factors. Moreover, Dawn, Orbiting
Carbon Observatory (OCO) and Wide-field Infrared Explorer (WIRE) are examples of
the moderate level of risk, but with aggressive uncertainty factors.
For the high and very high risk levels, there are a wide range of factors (30-70%)
based on the complexity of the missions. Figure 38 shows NASA missions plotted on the
lognormal distribution to provide a clear picture of the data.
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Figure 38. NASA Missions Data with NASA Developed Lognormal Distribution

The general guidelines to use the NUFs are:
- Analyst Judgment
- Mission Complexity
- Heritage Level
- Similarity of Missions
Finally, the risk factor can be changed as the mission development becomes more
mature, which allows for the adjusting of the factor to predict the actual cost or cost
growth. Therefore, a cost risk should not prescribe one method, but rather allow some
flexibility as long as the analyst gets the information they need to justify their
methodology. For example, it will be difficult to assess cost risk for a mission at an early
conceptual stage (which has limited programmatic or technical definition) using the more
complex methods. For such a case, simple method-using uncertainty factors might be
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more appropriate and still convey the relative cost risk for the mission. However, a
mission going through a major milestone should have sufficient detail defined to employ
a probabilistic method. Given adequate time and trained analysts, it should be feasible to
use one of the more complex methods. However, if a risk assessment and estimate need
to be generated very rapidly, then a simpler method must be employed.
4.2 Validation of NASA Uncertainty Factors
The first step in the validation process is the selection of the validation data points,
which were the same as the NASA historical data. Using the developed uncertainty
factors with NASA data to validate the quality of the factors for several risk levels, a
small subset of the database was conducted and analyzed, as follows:
4.2.1 Conservative Factors
1. All data with conservative factors with and three risk levels (Figure 39).
2. Data of conservative factors and missions with moderate risk only (Figure 40).
3. Data of conservative factors with moderate risk level up to 30% cost growth
(Figure 41).
4. Data of conservative factors with high risk level (Figure 42).
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Figure 39. Applied Conservative NUC to NASA Data
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Figure 40. Applied Conservative NUC for Moderate Risk Level to NASA Data
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Figure 41. Applied Conservative NUC for Moderate Risk Level for NASA Data up
to 30% of the Cost Growth

Figure 42. Applied Conservative NUC for High Risk Level to NASA Data
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4.2.2 Aggressive Factors
1. All data on aggressive uncertainty factors with three risk levels and all missions
(Figure 43).
2. Data on aggressive uncertainty factors with moderate risk level and all missions
(Figure 44).
3. Data on aggressive uncertainty factors with moderate risk level and missions with
less than 100% cost growth (Figure 45).

Figure 43. Applied Aggressive NUC for Three Risk Levels to NASA Data
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Figure 44. Applied Aggressive NUC for Moderate Risk Level to NASA Data
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Figure 45. Applied Aggressive NUC for Moderate Risk Level for NASA Missions
with Less than 100% Cost Growth
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From the figures above, the aggressive factor for moderate risk level covers 80% of
the data, thus factors will provide better predictions and estimates for NASA projects.
Finally, the data analysis should empirically validate previous cost estimates and their
associated risk analyses. Such a validation would help to improve both data quality and
risk estimation in NASA missions. It is vital to the credibility of both uncertainty factors
and its applications in NASA missions. This qualitative method can be valuable for
providing a better understanding of estimating overall risks for projects.
4.3 Landsat Data Continuity Mission (LDCM) Estimating Case
The LDCM is the successor mission to Landsat 7. Landsat satellites have
continuously acquired multi-spectral images of the global land surface since the launch of
the Landsat 1 in 1972. The Landsat data archive constitutes the longest record of the land
surface as viewed from space. The LDCM objective is to extend the ability to detect and
quantitatively characterize changes on the global land surface at a scale where natural and
man-made causes of change can be detected and differentiated. It will continue to obtain
valuable data and imagery to be used in agriculture, education, business, science, and
government. The LDCM, consistent with U.S. law and government policy, will continue
the acquisition, archiving, and distribution of moderate-resolution multispectral imagery
affording global, synoptic, and repetitive coverage of the Earth's land surface at a scale
where natural and human-induced changes can be detected, differentiated, characterized,
and monitored overtime. The science focus area served by LDCM will include: carbon
cycle, ecosystems, bio geochemistry, and Earth surface and interior. Plan Sub-goal 3A:
Study Earth from space to advance scientific understanding and meet societal needs.
NASA and Department of Interior (DOI) U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) were identified
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as the Landsat Program Management team under the authority of U.S. Code Title 15,
Chapter 82, "Land Remote Sensing Policy" and Presidential Decision Directive NSTC-3,
"Land Remote Sensing Strategy."
The lead NASA Center for LDCM is the Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC). The
lead USGS center for LDCM is the Center for Earth Resources Observation and Science
(EROS). The LDCM observatory is anticipated to launch aboard an Atlas V Model 401
launch vehicle from Vandenberg Air Force Base (VAFB) no earlier than December 2012.
USGS is responsible for the development of the Ground System, excluding procurement
of the Mission Operations Element (MOE), Flight Operations Team (FOT), and
establishment of the Mission Operations Center (MOC). The USGS is also responsible
for LDCM mission operations, after completion of the on-orbit checkout period. NASA
will serve as the system integrator for LDCM and lead the mission systems engineering
effort. LDCM is being undertaken by NASA as a stand-alone ('free-flyer') mission
planned for launch as soon as possible to provide continuity of Landsat data. Launch is
scheduled in December 2012.
Several independent reviews have been conducted to ensure that the project is in
compliance with technical, cost and schedule requirements. The LDCM has four main
elements: Operational Land Imager (OLI), Thermal Infrared Sensor (TIRS), Spacecraft,
and Ground Operation. Table 13 shows the independent review board qualitative scoring
of the cost uncertainties for the four main elements.
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le 13. Qualitative Cost Uncertainty Rating for the LDCM
Risk Level

OLI

Moderate

X

High
High +

TIRS

Spacecraft

Ground Operations
X

X
X

This mission completed four independent reviews that assessed the status of the
mission from the technical and programmatic viewpoint. Table 14 is focused on the
initial cost for each review. It is evident that the cost growth from System Requirements
Review/Mission Definition Review (SRR/MDR) to PDR from the project perspective is
approximately 40%. From the PDR to CDR, the cost growth is 4%. At this point in the
mission, there is a cost growth on 46% of the mission because of the addition of a 17month schedule. This is a valid increase, as the initial schedule was so unrealistic.
Additionally, all the TBDs have not yet occurred because the project is still under
development.

Table 14. LDCM Life-Cycle Reviews <Cost Changes
"i

L»CM^|lestoip|

N Initial Cost ($lg)

Initial Cost ($ft)

SRR/MDR

$645

$888

PDR

$904

$1071

C»

$941

$1016

TBD

TBD

SIR
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The technical approach for LDCM refers to any potential technical risk that has a
known impact associated with cost or schedule and technical uncertainty and growth.
This includes such things as technology development or inadequate technical margins. If
the NUFs are used for this project as an aggressive moderate risk with a factor of 1.3, one
can predict the cost growths will be 30% from the PDR. Thus, total actual cost will be
$1175M and will fall in the middle of the lognormal distribution (see Figure 46).

Figure 46. LDCM Predicted Cost Growth Four Uncertainty Factors

4.4 Final Comparison
The last verification point for the NUF is comparing the four methods of estimating
the uncertainty factors with the actual NASA data set (Table 15). There are five
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completed missions that were not used to develop the NUF lognormal distribution for
tested and used data sets (see Figure 9).
Table 15. Comparison of Cost Growth Using Different Uncertainty Factors- Test
Case for NUF
Risk
Factor as
Aggressive
and
Moderate
Risk Level
Mission

I-Cost

F-Cost

Air
NUF(1.3) Aerospace(1.816) Force(1.49)

BAH(1.7)

TRACE

$35.6

$40.3

$46.28

$64.65

$53.04

$60.52

SDO

$520.8

$633.5

$ 677.04

$945.77

$775.99

$885.36

DAWN

$216.9

$272.9

$281.97

$393.89

$323.18

$368.73

PHOENIX

$207.0

$296.5

$269.10

$375.91

$ 308.43

$351.90

$ 104.26

$145.64

$119.50

$136.34

CLOUDSAT

$80.2

$144.0

Figure 47 shows that the NUF is very close to the final cost. Thus, NUF provides a
better estimate than the others NUFs as displayed in the selected five missions. Note that
for the Trace, Solar Dynamics Observatory (SDO), and Dawn missions, the NUF are
within 2% of the final cost growth but, for the Phoenix and CloudSat missions, the final
cost growth is higher than NUF because it is higher than normal NASA cost growth;
however, the NUF is closer than other uncertainty factors. These two missions should
have been classified as a high level of risk and semi-aggressive uncertainty; thus the NUF
should been 1.5, which yields $310.5 for Phoenix and $120.3 for CloudSat.

90

Figure 47. Estimate Cost Growth with Four Uncertainty Factors Methods

Finally, using the NUFs for development of initial cost estimating for new P/p,
which should yield a more realistic estimate and help determine a final actual cost is
recommended. Furthermore, the gathered data allows one to form an informed a priori
assessment of future cost growth. Uncertainty in future cost growth is quantified by a
probability distribution. Arguments based on theory and analyses suggest that the
lognormal distribution is a reasonable choice. Finally, NUFs provide the parameters for
the distribution that best fit the NASA cost growth experience.
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NASA is a good investment of federal funds and strives to provide the best value to
the nation. NASA has consistently budgeted to unrealistic cost estimates, whose unreality
is reflected in the cost growth in many of its programs. NASA has been using available
uncertainty factors from the Aerospace Corporation, Air Force, and BAH to develop
projects risk posture. NASA has no insight into the development of these factors and, as
demonstrated here, this can lead to unrealistic risks in many NASA P/p. This contribution
of this project is the development of NASA missions' uncertainty factors from actual
historical NASA projects in order to estimate cost for independent reviews that provide
NASA senior management with the information and analysis to determine the appropriate
decision regarding P/p at KDPs.

5.1 Summary of Contributions
This doctoral project has special contributions to cost estimation for NASA P/p and
specifically for the independent analysis groups that are faced with the challenge of
providing realistic cost estimates for use in Agency-level decision-making. The
highlights of contributions are as follows:
5.1.1 Generated insights into NASA Cost Growth
This project investigated recent NASA cost growth history for sixty science missions.
These missions included both Space and Earth Science. These insights are best
summarized in Chapters 3 and 4. Reasons for cost growth are varied and often poorly
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understood. At the onset of a Program, technical details are also poorly understood.
Program Managers provide detailed estimates that lack rigor. It is difficult to push-back
without some sort of "report card" for the community. This research summarizes the
reasons for cost growth in many science missions.
5.1.2 Developed NASA Uncertainty Factors (NUFs)
This project examined NASA historical cost growth data and developed NUFs to be
implemented in realistic estimates of probability cost distributions. These NUFs are
distinctly different from those currently being used in several ways. In Chapter 4, it is
shown that the NUFs provide some guidelines for cost growth that would be useful in
many ways. For example, briefing senior management on the magnitudes of cost growth
typical of NASA projects could be accomplished with Table 12. Furthermore, these
factors can be used by decision-makers to assess the difference between an independent
estimate and a Program Manager's advocacy estimate which is worth reconciling. A
difference of 10%, for example, might be judged to be insignificant given the amount of
cost growth experienced in general on all Programs.

5.1.3 Identified Better-Fitting Cost Distributions for NASA
The purpose of this research was to develop a risk distribution for NUFs that would
be applicable in the early stages of the cost estimation of NASA missions. It has been
found that NASA cost growth fits a lognormal uncertainty distribution. Coupled with the
NUFs, the cost risk analysis would produce a more accurate estimate of final costs. This
is a significant contribution in light of current bias at NASA toward underestimating
costs. Additionally, the probability distribution of cost growth for sixty NASA missions
provides evidence of an exponentially-long tail. This is evidence that "Black Swan"
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programs are not exceptionally rare. It is a challenge to the programmatic and technical
communities to spot these types of programs and then have to bring that bad news to the
discussion table. It is recommended that for the programmatic analysts use Figure 34 to
remind Program Managers that major problems in program execution are not simply a
rare case of "bad luck." They happen more often than one would like to admit.
The cost risk analysis will be better understood because the uncertainty estimating
will produce a more realistic estimate, in lieu of the signification bias toward
underestimating that the Agency experiences. As discussed above, this project proved
that the factors developed are feasible, more relevant to NASA's missions, and useful for
estimating the cost risk of future missions.
5.2 Limitations of NASA Uncertainty Factors
As with any estimating method, there are limitations to this approach. The NUFs
implementation has great dependency on the cost analysts for selecting the best range for
the specific mission. Then, usage of the right factors contains a great deal of uncertainty
with itself. Additionally, this method is an approximation approach, so some missions
may fall outside these factors. Finally, expert judgment goes hand in hand with NUF
usage. One must understand that these factors are based on historical data, which may not
be relevant in the future due to new manufacturing processes, new technologies, and
better productivity than the historical data supported.
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5.3 Future Work
The following areas can be improved:
1. The results could be made statistically relevant by simply increasing the number
of historical missions captured in the database. Any increase in the number of
missions in the database would result in the increased accuracy of the results.
2. In addition to increasing the accuracy of the results, studying additional historical
missions for cost growth and risk data could also be used to provide a good check
for the methodology that was developed through this project. These results could
then be checked against actual data for determining where the actual cost of the
mission is contained within the predicted estimate.
3. Test the NUF for missions in various life-cycle phases and compare the results to
this project to determine if change has any effect on the life-cycles phases on the
NUF.
4. Emphasize whether the understanding of the technical and programmatic risk
during the missions' reviews will provide more accurate prediction of future cost
growth for those missions.
5. The Microsoft® Excel-based tool that was developed for this project is very
preliminary and basic. A more user-friendly tool should be developed to enable
the methodology to be used by individuals who are not familiar with the research
task that developed it. This would greatly enhance the applicability of the factors.
6. The factors have to be accepted by the cost analysts' community for
implementation by the Agency and consider developing an Agency standard to
request the usage.
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This research provides an important contribution to the discipline of cost estimating.
In particular, it has developed a solid database of actual cost growth history and adds
some statistical rigor to the derivation of cost growth factors based on this data.
Additionally, it is expected that this work will be referenced for independent cost
estimates, correction of advocacy-bias in project-generated estimates, and other
programmatic work.
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Appendix A
Project Proposal Plan
The research project will use mixed-method design, but mostly it is a quantitative
research approach that seeks prediction for generalization to other NASA projects. The
qualitative portion will come toward implementation of the developed NUFs. The
following proposed steps will be conducted to complete this project:
1. Literature review of NASA projects cost and schedule growth
2. Identification of NASA projects
3. Data selection and analysis
4. Expert opinion and relevant working testing and evaluation
5. Develop a method of analysis
6. Develop NASA uncertainty factors
7. Test factors
8. Compare results
9. Make recommendations to implement the developed process
10. Publish the work
11. Complete research project
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Figure 48, Research Project Timeline
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Appendix B
NASA Cost Risk Policy
There is no specific cost risk policy that directs the cost estimator on how a cost risk
assessment should be performed and included in a cost estimate. The only requirement is
that a cost risk assessment has been conducted, the results incorporated into the estimate
and the probabilistic cost estimate is presented at the 70% CL. NASA Policy Directives
(NPDs) are policy statements that describe what NASA must do to achieve its vision,
mission, and external mandates and who is responsible for carrying out those
requirements. NASA Procedural Requirements (NPRs) provide Agency-mandatory
instructions and requirements to implement NASA policy as delineated in an associated
NPD. The following NPDs and NPRs provide information pertaining to NASA's cost risk
requirements. These NPRs in conjunction with the Cost Risk volume of the NASA CEH
provide the guidance and references for the NASA cost estimator to conduct the cost risk
estimate as appropriate.

B.l NPR 7120.5 Space Flight Program and Project Management Requirements
NPR 7120.5, NASA Space Flight Program and Project Management Requirements,
(http://nodis3.gsfc.nasa. go v/displayDir.cfm?Internal_ID=N_PR_7120_005D)covers
requirements by which NASA formulates and implements space flight P/p, consistent
with the governance model contained in NPD 1000.0,NASA Strategic Management and
Governance Handbook, (http://nodis.hq.nasa.gov/displayDir.cfm?t=NPD&c=1000&s=0).
Specific to cost risk, this NPR covers P/p management's cost risk roles and
responsibilities as well as P/p cost risk requirements by life-cycle phase. This includes:
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•

Risk assessments

•

Risk evaluations

•

Risk mitigations

•

Identification of margin and reserves

•

Associated oversight and approval processes

A number of cost risk related activities are required early in the project's life-cycle
(Pre-Phase A through Phase B). Listed below are required activities or products relevant
to cost risk during a program or project's life-cycle:

1. A high-level WBS consistent with the NASA standard space flight project WBS,
schedule, and a rough order of magnitude cost estimate and cost range.
2. A baseline mission concept document that includes key risk drivers and
mitigation options.
3. A preliminary full cost life-cycle cost estimate that includes reserves, along with
the level of confidence estimate provided by the reserves based on a cost risk
analysis.

The instructions and requirements stated in this NPR are associated with the policy
set

forth

in

NPD

7120.4C,

NASA

Program/Project

(http://nodis3.gsfc.nasa.gov/ displayDir.cfm?t=NPD&c=7120&s=4C).

Management
This document

describes the management system governing formulation, approval, implementation, and
evaluation of P/p.
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B.2

NPR 8000.4 Risk Management Procedural Requirements
NPR

8000.4,

NASA

Risk

Management

Procedural

Requirements

(http://nodis3.gsfc.nasa.gov/ displayDir.cfm?t=NPR&c=8000&s=4) outlines program and
project requirements and information that pertain to risk management, as required by
NPR 7120.5D and NPD 8700.1, NASA Policy for Safety and Mission Success
(http://nodis.hq.nasa.gov/

displayDir.cfm?t=NPD&c=8700&s=lC).

This NPR also

introduces the continuous risk management (CRM) process and defines risk management
concepts, risk management requirements, and risk management responsibilities.
CRM is a 6-step process that is used to manage risk and achieve planned objectives.
This

process

involves

identifying,

analyzing,

planning,

tracking,

controlling,

documenting, and communicating risks effectively.
NPR 8000.4 requires P/p to perform risk analyses that consist of estimating the
likelihood and the consequences of risks and the timeframe in which action must be taken
on an identified risk to avoid harm. The recommended methods of analyzing risks
include, but are not limited to, the following:

•

Individual or group expert judgment.

•

Statistical analysis of historical data.

•

Uncertainty analysis of cost, performance, and schedule projections (consists of
building and running a probabilistic model of the system under investigation,
including the chance variation inherent in real-life cost, performance, and
schedule).
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B.3 Cost Risk Management Requirements in NPR 8000.4
NPR 8000.4 Chapter 4, "Special Requirements for Programs and Projects," paragraph
4.2 "Cost Risk Management," requires cost risk management to be part of the CRM
process and delineates specific cost risk requirements, but does not describe the process
or how they are to be implemented. This cost estimating handbook contains that
information.
B.4 Cost-Risk Management
While some cost-risk methodologies can be generalized to Space Flight Programs, or
even non-Space Flight endeavors, the focus and the tools discussed here are applied to
Categories I & II major Space Flight Projects. The objective of cost risk management is
to continuously determine the rolled-up risk impact on the cost of the P/p by organizing,
obtaining, and using cost-risk information.
Stakeholder interest in integrated cost-risk was codified in June 2006 with the OMB
update of Circular A-ll, Part 7 and the Supplement to Part 7 (Capital Programming
Guide) and in July 2006 with the update of the FAR (FAR Case 2004-019) that
implements the earned value management system (EVMS) policy in accordance with the
changes to Circular A-ll, Part 7. These updates require the creation and management of
risk adjusted budgets.
This supplemented GAO interest to better NASA cost-risk management as
documented in the May 2004 GAO report on NASA cost estimating.
Cost risk management integrates the CRM process, cost estimating, cost-risk
assessment/analysis (utilizing the identified risks in the project risk list and the cost
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estimate), and EVM, with procurement, source selection, cost data collection, and cost
data analysis as supporting disciplines.
There are three activities that make up integrated cost-risk: Identify and Quantify
Cost-Risk; Establish Cost-Risk Reporting; and, Manage Cost-Risk Using Reported Data.
These activities are summarized below:
Identify and Quantify Cost-Risk
•

Identify and assess risk.

•

Translate risk assessment into cost impact.

•

Perform "S"-curve and CRM scenario-based cost-risk.

•

Incorporate CRM scenario-based and "S"-curve cost-risk in CADRe Part C lifecycle cost estimate (LCCE).

Establish Cost-Risk Reporting
.

Develop RFP CADRe & EVM Data Requirements Description (DRD) and
equivalent project plan requirements.

•

Evaluate EVM and LCCE DRDs in proposals/project plans.

•

Perform Integrated Baseline Review.

Manage Cost-Risk Using Reported Data
•

Perform EVM performance measurement & CADRe "S"-curve analysis.

•

Compile end-of-contract cost-risk data for database updates, data evaluation, and
analysis and cost-risk algorithm updates.

Cost risk management is performed in three overlapping stages during project lifecycle phases. Generally speaking, identification, quantification and establishing cost-risk
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reporting occur at the end of each phase, followed by the use of that reporting for costrisk management in the next phase. This cycle repeats as illustrated in Figure 49.
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Figure 49. When Integrated Cost-Risk is Required

Pre-Phase A/Phase A to Phase B
In pre-Phase A and the early Phase A of formulation, P/p should identify and quantify
cost-risk to be incorporated in the project's CADRe LCCE that forms the basis for the
proposed project budget.
The CADRe has three-parts: Part A - narrative project description; Part B - technical
characteristics; and, Part C - risk-adjusted LCCE. Part C requires any actual costs-to-date
plus an estimate-to-complete with cost methodology and cost-risk quantification
documentation. Near the end of Phase A, an ICE is performed assessing cost and cost risk
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in preparation for transition to Phase B. CRM risk identification is a key input into costrisk quantification for the project's CADRe LCCE. CRM risk likelihood-based cost
impacts are compared with the cost estimating cost-risk impacts and reconciled to
produce the project's CADRe LCCE. Also, in late Phase A, the project develops data
requirements to establish cost-risk reporting for cost-risk management using the reported
cost-risk data beginning early and extending throughout Phase B.
Phase B to Phase C
In late Phase B, P/p updates their CADRe LCCE including identification and
quantification of cost-risk and documents reasons for cost growth for the final riskadjusted budget for approval at confirmation. Once approved, the P/p incorporates the
risk handling budgets for cost-risk in the EVMS's performance measurement baseline
(PMB) to be tracked and managed in Phase C of implementation. Establishing new costrisk reporting in Phase B is only activated if there are any changes necessary in the
reporting data used in managing Phase C cost-risk. Projects then incorporate and budget
risk handling tasks in their EVMS. Projects also flow down the requirements for cost-risk
in any contractor's EVMS in all appropriate procurements.
Phase C to Phases D & E
The identification, quantification, and updating cost-risk reporting (if necessary) of
integrated cost-risk is again repeated prior to entry into implementation of Phases D & E
to manage cost-risk using reported data in those phases. Working synergistically with
integrated cost risk and the EVM is used to plan and budget for risk handling and
reporting. P/p offices will also specifically evaluate the EVM cost-risk handling
performance measurement on a monthly basis.
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EVMS Control Accounts contain work packages where risk handling activities are
planned, budgeted, and measured. P/p meeting EVMS requirement thresholds incorporate
meaningful, measurable, and relevant risk handling activities in the EVMS. Risk handling
activities are budgeted, scheduled and assessed as part of the project's EVM planning and
performance assessment process. EVM data is used to track performance measurement
progress of the risk handling activities, against the project's integrated baseline, that is,
the PMB integrated with the integrated master schedule (IMS). The rationale for this is
that all risk handling activities ultimately involve use of project resources (e.g.,
personnel, schedule, and budget). EVM allows the project to plan and assess performance
based upon an integration of these resources.
Performance against the plan and EVM reporting can include WBS elements
identified as risky during integrated cost-risk activities to ensure the Project Manager has
performance measurement information on those WBS elements most likely to cause cost
and schedule problems.
Each month's EAC from the EVMS can include a cost-risk exercise resulting in an
EAC cost-risk S-curve for the effort. The cost-risk S-curve provides higher quality
information to the Project Manager about how confident he or she should be about the
project's EAC versus the contractor's Latest Revised Estimate (LRE) that includes cost
impacts due to current levels of risk. Using EVM metrics (e.g., Cost Performance Index
(CPI); Schedule Performance Index (SPI); Schedule/Cost Index (SCI); etc.) in
combination with Microsoft® Excel and Monte Carlo simulation software, Control
Account and Work Package activity cost-risks can be modeled and statistically
summarized for the S-curve evaluation.
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EVM cost-risk reporting requirements should be described in the solicitation's data
requirements section such that contractors understand that risks identified in the cost
estimate, by the source evaluation boards and independent risk identification teams are to
be reported in the EVM contract performance reports (CPR). Such CPR data requirement
language should read like the following as developed by the EVM Working Group and
posted on the Cost Analysis Division website.
Contents
The CPR shall include data pertaining to all authorized contract work, including both
priced and unpriced efforts that have been authorized at a not-to-exceed amount in
accordance with the Contracting Officer's direction. The CPR shall separate direct and
indirect costs and identify elements of cost for all direct reporting. The CPR shall include
Formats 1 through 5, down to a WBS Level -4. A lower level of reporting may be
required for elements that are classified as "special interest" technical, schedule, or cost
risk areas.
Earned value performance measurement data for government and/or contractoridentified medium- and high-risk WBS items shall be reported on Format 1 of the
monthly CPR until such time as both government project management and the contractor
agree that they no longer represent high risks. This reporting shall be at a level where the
risk resides in the WBS. For medium- and high-risk elements lower than Level 4, specific
narrative variance analyses are not required unless classified as "special interest".
To ensure an integrated approach to risk management, the data provided by this CPR
DID shall be in consonance with the WBS, Integrated Master Schedule (IMS), Risk
Management Processes, Plans and Reports (where required), Probabilistic Risk
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Assessment

Processes

and

Reports

(where

required),

the

CADRe

and

the

Monthly/Quarterly Contractor Financial Management Reports (533/Q). The Financial
Management Reports shall include reconciliation between the 533Q and the CPR. This
reconciliation may be included within the required CPR formats.
Format
CPR formats shall be completed according to the instructions outlined in DI-MGMT81466A and the following forms: Format 1 (DD Form 2734/1); Format 2 (DD Form
2734/2); Format 3 (DD Form 2734/3); Format 4 (DD Form 2734/4); and Format 5 (DD
Form

2734/5).

Samples

of

the

forms

are

http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/infomgt/forms/ddforms2500-2999.htm.

located

at

Variance

analysis thresholds which, if exceeded, require problem analysis, narrative explanations
and corrective action plan descriptions for all level three and other special interest WBS
elements. Variance analysis thresholds will initially be +/- 10% of both current and
cumulative cost and schedule variance to date. The variance analysis thresholds may
change once the personnel evaluate the contractor's schedule and cost performance and
risk.
Special emphasis should be placed in the variance analysis on cost and schedule
growth linked to technical risks (e.g., technology development efforts, design
engineering, integration, complexity, project management, systems engineering, duration
constraints, etc.) identified by both the government and contractor.
Contractor format may be substituted for CPR formats whenever they contain all the
required data elements at the specified reporting levels in a form suitable for NASA
management use. The CPR shall be submitted electronically and followed up with a

Ill

signed paper copy. The American National Standards Institute (ANSI) X12/XML
standards (transaction sets 839 for cost and 806 for schedule), or the United National
Electronic Data Interchange for Administration, Commerce and Transport (EDIFACT),
http://www.unece.org/trade/untdid/welcome.htm

equivalent, or any other electronic

delivery method deemed acceptable by the Project Office shall be used for Electronic
Data Interchange.
Refer to the EVM website, http://evm.nasa.gov, for additional information regarding
EVM. Refer to NPR 7120.5 for EVM applicability and NASA requirements.
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Appendix C
NASA Cost Risk as Part of the Cost Estimating Process
Cost risks are those risks due to economic factors such as rate uncertainties, cost
estimating errors, and statistical uncertainty inherent in the estimate. Cost risk is
dependent upon other fundamental

risk dimensions (technical, schedule, and

programmatic risks) so these must all be assessed to arrive at a true picture of project
risk.
Cost-risk assessment takes into account cost, schedule, and technical risks that are
then factored back into the cost estimate. To quantify the cost impacts due to risk, sources
of risk need to be identified. NASA cost analysts should be concerned with three sources
of risk and ensure that the model calculating the cost accounts for:

•

Risk inherent in the cost estimating methodology. For example, if a regressionbased cost estimating relationship (CER) is used, it has an associated standard
error of the estimate (SEE), confidence intervals, and prediction intervals, any of
which can be used to include cost estimating methodology risk in the estimate.

•

Risk inherent in the technical aspects of the systems being developed. Into this
category of risk fall risk sources such as the technology's state-of-the-art
design/engineering (Technology Readiness Levels (TRLs)) are good indicators of
this risk source), integration, manufacturing,

schedule, complexity, etc.

Quantifying the cost impacts due to these kinds of risk is not as statistically
derivative as is CER risk. Figure 50 graphically displays the effects of cost
estimating methodology risk and technical input risk.
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•

Risk inherent in the correlation between WBS elements. Correlation
assessment determines to what degree one WBS element's change in cost is
related to another's and in which direction. For example, if the cost of the
satellite's payload goes up and the cost of the propulsion system goes up then
there is a positive correlation between both subsystems' costs. Many WBS
elements within space systems have positive correlations with each other and the
cumulative effect of this positive correlation tends to increase the range of the
possible costs.

Even as early as Pre-Phase A, it is important to capture risk in cost estimates,
especially technical, schedule, programmatic and cost data. Even at this early stage, there
are many risks that can and should be identified and addressed in a cost risk assessment.
Cost estimating uncertainty, technical input variable uncertainty, and correlation risks all
need to be considered. Schedule risk can be handled outside these three types of risk by
applying probabilistic activity duration risk to the critical path analysis (CPA).
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Figure 50. Cost Modeling and Technical Input Risk

Working with project office staff, the cost estimator should identify cost-risk drivers
and vary the operating scenarios and input parameters through the conduct of
comprehensive probabilistic and deterministic cost-risk and sensitivity analyses. It is the
job of the cost estimator to estimate the effects of identifying, assessing, and analyzing
cost-risk drivers (e.g., probabilistic cost-risk analysis) and varying cost drivers (e.g.,
deterministic cost-risk) and to revise the LCC estimates reflecting the selected variations,
pointing out the relationship between the LCC and the key technical and/or operational
parameter risks. Discrete technical cost-risk assessments involve identifying and cost
estimating specific cost-driving technical risks.
For example, a notional new electronic component for a spacecraft might have risk in
key engineering performance parameters (KEPPs) such as dynamic load resistance,
operating voltage, power regulation, radiation resistance, emissivity, component mass,
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operating temperature range and operating efficiency. Technical staff can identify these
KEPP risks during cost-risk assessment. Instead of probabilistic distributions and Monte
Carlo simulations, however, mitigation costs for these risks are estimated based on their
probabilities of manifesting discrete changes in the technical parameters (e.g., increased
component mass or power regulation). Justifying the amount of cost risk dollars is a
function of the detail specification of cost estimating, technical, and correlation risks that
drive the cost risk range. Cost risk dollars that add, for example, 30% additional costs to
the point estimate, have to be defensible with a cost-risk methodology that justifies the
endpoints of individual WBS element cost-risk distributions, SEE regression line, and
solid correlation coefficients.
As a project moves through the conceptual design phase, the range of feasible
alternatives decrease and the definition of those alternatives increase. At this stage, there
is a crucial need to identify pertinent cost issues and to correct them before corrective
costs become prohibitive. Issues and cost drivers must be identified to build successful
options. By accomplishing a cost estimate on proposed project alternatives, a Project
Office can determine the cost impact of the alternatives. These cost drivers feed an
increasingly detailed cost-risk assessment that takes into account cost, technical, and
schedule risks for the estimate. The point estimate and the risk assessment work together
to create the total LCC estimate.
As a project moves through the preliminary design phase and the project definition
increases, cost estimators should keep the estimate up-to-date with definition changes and
have a full cost risk assessment to defend the estimate, reduce updated estimate turnaround time, and give the decision-maker a clearer picture for "what if drills or major
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decisions. The role of the cost estimator during this phase is critical. It is important to
understand the basis of the estimate, from the technical baseline to the cost risk
assessment and to be able to document and present the results of these efforts to the
decision-makers. It is the cost estimator's responsibility to ensure the best possible LCCE
with recommended levels of unallocated future expense (UFE) based on updated cost risk
assessments in Phase B. These estimates will support budget formulation and source
selection support in the transition from Phase B to Phases C/D.
When conducting Phase C/D estimates, new information collected from contractor
sources and from testing must be fed back into the point estimate and the risk assessment,
creating a more detailed project estimate. During this phase, the cost-risk assessment
should be very detailed, not only including any changes in requirements or project
design, but other details provided by project technical experts such as testing and
schedule impacts. While the product is being designed, developed, and tested, there are
changes which can impact the estimate and the risk assessment. It is critical to capture
these changes to maintain a realistic program estimate now and in the future. During this
phase, programmatic data may have just as much of an impact on the estimate and risk
assessment as technical data.
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Appendix D
The Twelve Tenets of NASA Cost-Risk
Tenet 1: NASA cost- risk assessment, a subset of cost estimating, supports cost
management for optimum project management.
Tenet 2: NASA cost-risk assessment is based on a common set of risk and uncertainty
definitions.
Tenet 3: NASA cost- risk assessment is a joint activity between subject matter experts
and cost analysis.
Tenet 4: NASA cost-risk is composed of CERs and technical risk assessment plus cost
element correlation assessment influenced by other programmatic risk factors.
Tenet 5: NASA technical cost-risk assessment combines both probabilistic and discrete
technical risk assessments.
Tenet 6: NASA cost-risk probability distribution is justifiable and correlation levels are
based on actual cost history to the maximum extent possible.
Tenet 7: NASA cost-risk assessment ensures cost estimates are likely-to-be-vice as
specified for optimum.
Tenet 8: NASA cost-risk assessments account for all known variance sources and include
provisions for uncertainty.
Tenet 9: NASA cost-risk can be an input to every cost estimate's cost readiness level
(CRL).
Tenet 10: NASA cost-risk integrates the quantification of cost-risk and schedule risk by
enlisting the support of NASA schedule and EVM analysts.
Tenet 11: NASA decision-makers need to know how much money is in the estimate to
cover risk events, which WBS elements are allocated, and the CL of the estimate.
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Tenet 12: NASA project cost-risk data, collected as a function of government and
contractor project estimates and actual, contract negotiation and contract DRDs, is
compiled into the OCE database.
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Appendix E
Relationship of the Research Project and Published Literature
This section identifies key publications related to cost and schedule growth and offers
an assessment of this literature in relation to the research project.
Research Problem Statement:
The research proposes to develop uncertainty factors from actual NASA historical
project data to be used to classify risk for future cost estimation and support the
independent reviews which inform NASA senior management and enable them to make
the right decision regarding the project progress.
Problem Area 1
Determine NASA projects from which to gather data from as it relates to cost and schedule
growth for science missions.
Problem Area 2
Develop a method to evaluate NASA project cost and schedule data by evaluating causes for
growth and create measurement formalisms that account for multiple sources of growths.
Problem Area 3
Develop NASA Uncertainty Factors by capturing the trend of growth data from the selected
science missions and compare these factors with other uncertainty factors.
Problem Area 4
Bring together research and uncertainty factors developed in problem area one through three into
a coherent tool to be use in quantification risk for NASA future projects.
Table 16 presents an assessment of the literature with respect to these 4 problem
areas. A color-coding scheme was defined and presented below. The color code indicates
the degree to which the problem area is addressed in the referenced work.
COLOR CODING SCHEME
Red: Problem area not addressed in the referenced article or work.
Yellow: Problem area addressed to some extent in the referenced article or work; but, insufficient
to meet this dissertation's research objectives.
Green: Problem area addressed in the referenced article or work.
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Table 16. Literature Assessment Using the Four Problem Areas
Literature Assessment

Problem
Area 1

Problem
Area 2

Problem
Area 3

Problem
Area 4

Arena, V.A, and et al. (2006). "Impossib e certainty: cost risk analysis for Air Force systems."
Published 2006. by the RAND Corporation.
Bitten, R.E., Bearden, D. A., Lao, L. Y., Park, T.H. (2003). "The Effect of Schedule constraints
on the Success of Planetary Missions." 2003 Elservier Ltd.

Bitten, R.E., Emmons, D.L, and Freaner, C.W. (2008). "In Search of the Optimal Funding
Profile: the Effect of Funding Profiles on Cost and Schedule Growth." ISPA/SCEA 2008 Joint
International Conference. The Netherlands May2008.

Bitten, R.E., Emmons, D.L., and Freaner, C.W. (2005). "Using Historical NASA Cost and
Schedule Growth to set Future Program and Project Reserve Guidelines."

Connley, Warren. (2004). "Integrated Risk Management within NASA Programs/Projects,
GSFC.

Coonce, T. (2008). "NASA Cost and Risk Workshop, " September 2008.

Cooper, L. (2003). "Assessing Riskfrom a Stakeholder Perspective, " IEEE, Paper# 1078.

Datta, S., and Mukherjee, S. (2001). "Developing Risk Management Matrix for Effective Project
Planning-An Empirical Study, " by the Project Management Institution, Vol. 32, No. 2, pp 45-57.

Dillon, Robin. (2003). "Programmatic Risk Analysis for Critical Engineering Systems under
Tight Resource Constraints" Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 51, No. 3, May-June 2003,
pp. 354 - 370.

Emmons, D.L., Bitten, R.E., and Freaner, C.W. (2006). "Using Historical NASA Cost and
Schedule Growth to Set Future Program and Project Reserve Guidelines." IEEE Paper #1545.
December.
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Problem
Area 1

Problem
Area 2

Problem
Area 3

Problem
Area 4

GAO: Government Accountability Office, (2001). "Major Management Challenges and Program
Risks for NASA," report issued January 2001.

Grey, S. (1995). Practical Risk Assessment for Project Management. By John Wiley & Sons.
Hulett, D. (2007). "Integrated Cost/Schedule Risk Analysis, " Program Management Challenge,
2007.
Hulett, D. (2007). "Integrated Cost/Schedule Risk Analysis, " Program Management Challenge,
2007.

Jiang, P., Haimes, Y. Y., (2004). "Risk Management for Leontief-Based Interdependent
Systems," Risk Analysis, Vol. 24, No. 5.

Kaplan, S., 1997. "The Words of Risk Analysis," Risk Analysis, Vol. 4, No. 17.

Kellogg, R., Phan, S. (2002). " An Analogy-Based Method for Estimating the Costs of SpaceBased Instruments," IEEEAC Paper #1160.
Mlynczak, B., Perry, B., Science Support Office, NASA. "SMD Earth and Space Mission Cost
Driver Comparison Study." March 2009.
Nadler, David. (2004). "Building Better Boards, " Harvard Business Review.
NASA Independent Program Assessment Office-Standard Operating Procedure, 2008.
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Appendix F
Non-NASA Uncertainty Factors
There are three different sets of uncertainty factors, below:
1. Uncertainty factors that were developed by Booz-Allen and Hampton
from NRO missions.

Table 17. NRO Missions Uncertainty Factors

Aggressive

Level

2.

Most Likely

Conservative

Uncertainty factors that were developed from Air Force missions.

Table 18. Air Force Missions Uncertainty Factors

3.

hW
Low Plus
Moderate
Moderate Plus
High
High Plus
Very High

0.9S
0.96
0J7
0.98
0.98
0.99
1

Very High Plus

1

1.1

1.23

13«
1.49
1.61
1.74
1.87

Uncertainty factors that were developed by Aerospace Corporation.
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Table 19. The Aerospace Corporation Uncertainty Factors

1.111

Low
Medium
Low
Medium

0,932

1

1.35

0.15

0.887

1

1.583

0.25

Medium
High
High

0.841

1416
2.05

0.35

High+
Very High

0.752
0.707

1
1
1
1

0.662

1

4.5

0.617

1

6

0.797

2.5
3

Very High
Extra
High

0.45
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Appendix G
Goodness of Fit Summary for All Tested Cases
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Figure 52. PDF and the Goodness of Fit of 44 Missions
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Appendix H
NASA Lognormal Distribution Model

N A S A U F For Log-normal Distribution for Amer's Project

0,035

NASAUF- Log-normal
Distribution

Clct«itoHiB8lfln

0.025
iai%r«<w*-»M—«T»«rMAWI

If a random variable, Y, has a normal distribution *Ottr),
then the distnbution of X~txpfY} is log-normal, denoted
fopJi^KaJThe probability density of a log-normal vanable
equa\sifr)~x]-(2xo*f''s-exp{-<}m.ffL/(2<il)l
The mean
value and the variance are £P0=ex'p(ii+a!/3 and
2
VarQCt*aip{ti4-(m *n)i respectively, where by m'exp{i/}
Tne mode lsMox=exp{u}/B,the median is easily obtained,
Afex-axpbd because of the relation befweenthe normal
and log-normal This relationship is also used in computing
probabilities!or a log-normal distribution Following Gallon
(Oalton, 1879) the log-normal is used when we consider
the multiplication or the geometnc meanfonndependent
randomvanables, andthe Central Limit theorem appliesto
their logarithms
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Figure 56. NASA Lognormal Distribution Model
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Appendix I
NASA Uncertainty Factors
The NUFs listed below were developed as part of this research paper. This table
should be used with the NASA lognormal model from Appendix H.

Level of Risk

Tab e 20. NUFs Developed from this Research Project
NASA Uncertainty Factors
None - Risk
Adjusted

Conservative Semi-Aggressive

Aggressive

Moderate (10-30%)

1

1.1

1.2

1.3

High (30-75%)

1

1.3

1.5

1.75

Very High (>75%)

1

1.75

2.1

2.5

Appendix J
NASA Joint Confidence Level Paradox - A History of Denial

Historical Cost and Schedule Growth Data Set
Compiled Cost & Schedule Growth Data Set
The following cost and schedule growth data is a combined list of die earliest available and latest
available data for 188 projects. Some of the names are the same, but supplementary' data led us to
believe they were separate projects. In fact they may not be. renaming, rebaselineing. and whitewashing
make this type of data mining and analysis very difficult. All data comes from reputable sources,
however errors probably exist, and some projects are still in development, so values may continue to
evolve.
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\r4SA 's Joint Confidence Level Paradox - A History

ofDetuaJ

2009 Cost Estimating

Symposium

It shows an average cost growth of 98.2%, a median cost growth of 53.3%, and average schedule growth
of 56 8%, and a median schedule growth of 34 9%. This is abysmal to say the least and exceeds many of
the recently pubhshed papers values This data was not obtained nntil after paper was completed, so
none was used in our analysis, but is included in an attempt to aide future researchers.
Latest
Available

Theme

Name

Initial

Hehophysics

ACE

$ 1 4 1 10

Earth Sci

ACRIMSAT

Earth Sci

Percent
Change

-231%

57

62

8 2%

43

45

4 7%

98

104 2 %

40

50

24 7 %

89

107

19 4 %

50

69

38 0 %

114

133

17 4 %

41

60

46 3 %

$ 6 5 6 00

85 3%

48

AFE

$ 1 5 9 00

$ 387 00

143 4 %

Canceled

$ 5 5 00

$ 5 5 00

0 0%

AIM
Aqua
Aquarius

Manned

ASRM

Manned

ATP
AURA
Aura (Chem-1) or
Chemistry

Earth Sci

Final
Schedule

$ 3 5 4 00

Apollo
Earth Sci

Initial
Schedule

ACTS
AHMS
Heliophysics

$ 1 0 8 50

Percent
change

AXAF

$ 6 1 10

$ 8 1 20

32 9 %

$7 000 00

$ 25 400 00

262 9%

$ 762 50

$ 1 006 00

31 9 %

$1,506 70

$ 3 251 80

115 8 %

$ 3 7 2 00

$ 1 053 00

1831%

Canceled

$ 524 00

$ 763 00

45 6 %

$1 410 00

$ 6,022 00

3271%

$ 6 8 20

$1703

149 7 %

38

89

135 4 %

$1 4 3 6 40

$ 1 , 3 7 5 90

-4 2 %

92

110

19 6 %

$ 4 4 2 00

$ 4 5 4 00

2 7%

Hehophysics

BARREL

Earth Sci

CALIPSO

54

Planetary

Cassini

Manned

CAU

ASO

Chandra

69

79

14 5%

ASO

CHIPSAT

30

40

33 3 %

Hehophysics

CINDI

41

95

131 7 %

Manned

CLCS

$ 1 7 5 00

$ 399 00

128 0 %

Canceled

$ 8 0 20

$ 1 4 4 00

79 6 %

36

85

1366%

81

8 0%

Clementine

19

Earth Sci

Cloud Sat

75

Heliophysics

Cluster
Cluster-2 (Rumba &
Tengo)
Cluster-2 (Salsa &
Samba)

75

130

73 3 %

COBE

68

88

38

40

29 4 %
4 2%

Heliophysics
ASO
Planetary

CONTOUR
Cosmic Background
Explorer
COSTR
CRAF

Earth Sci
Planetary

Earth Sci

$ 6 9 10

$ 9 6 80

40 1 %

$ 9 7 50

$ 1 5 9 70

63 8 %

$ 221 00

$ 673 00

204 5%

$3,593 00

$ 3 351 00

-6 7 %

Canceled/ Development

CRRES

38

86

126 3%

DART

31

43

38 7 %

DAWN
D e e p Impact

Planetary

131

D e e p Space 1
DSMS

202 8

287 1

41 6 %

37

53

43 2 %

$ 1 9 4 10

$ 252 00

29 8 %

44

63

43 9 %

$ 7 3 30

$ 9 9 30

35 5 %

33

43

28 5 %

36
$ 7 2 00

$1581

ERAST

$ 181 30

$ 173 00

-4 6 %

ESSP

$ 1 4 5 10

$ 171 8 0

18 4 %

EO-1

P a g e 106

119 6 %

33

58

74 2 %
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ASO
Heliophysics

ASO
ASO
Planetary
Planetary
Planetary
Earth Sci
Heliophysics
Heliophysics
ASO
Earth Sci

Earth Sci
Earth Sci
Earth Sci
Earth Sci
Earth Sci
Earth Sci
Earth Sci
Earth Sci
ASO
Earth Sci
Earth Sci
Planetary

ASO
ASO
ASO
ASO
ASO
Heliophysics
Earth Sci
Heliophysics
ASO
Earth Sci
Planetary
ASO
ASO
Earth Sci

ET
EUVE
FAST
FCF
FTS
FTS
FUSE
GALEX
Galileo Orbiter
Galileo Probe
Galilleo
Genesis
Geospace RBSP
Geotail
GGS
GLAST
Glory
GOES
GOES
GOESI
GOES J
GOESK
GOESL
GOESM
GOESN
GOESO
GOESP
GP-B
GPM
GRACE
GRAIL
GRO
GRO - (Compton
Gamma Ray Ob)
HESSI
HETE
HST
HSTSI
HST SSM
HST-OTA
IBEX
ICESAT
IMAGE
INTEGRAL
JASON
JUNO
JWST
Kepler
LADEE
Landsat 7
LANDSAT-D

2909 Cost Estimating

$349 60
$107 40
$ 3 2 50
$118 90
$317 00
$ 317 00
$ 8 5 90
$ 4 1 10

$96170
$32200
$ 4 2 90
$11410
$48500
$453 20
$1437
$8710

1751%
199 8%
32 0%
-4 0%
53 0%
43 0%
67 3%
1119%

$ 276 20
$126 10

$ 1 63900
$162 90

493 4%
29 2%

$ 334 00

$ 649 00

94 3%

$ 554 60
$ 691 00

$1,241 00
$ 1,787 00

$ 709 30

1021%

$79 30

$88 40

11 5%

$183 80

$ 677 00

268 3%

$ 3 2 00
$840
$435 00

$63 50
$23 50
$ 1,682 00

98 4%
179 8%
286 7%

$ 561 70

$ 121 30
$83 60
$ 8 20
$77 50

$177
$89
$11
$87

385 1%

00
20
90
80

45 9%
6 7%
451%
13 3%

$ 900 00

$ 4,900 00

444 4%

$387 10
$260 10

$ 508 80
$ 538 00

31 4%
106 8%
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58
89

20 8%
101 1 %

44
37
43
43

107
60
136
136

143 2%
614%
216 3%
216 3%

34

34 9%

58

46
44
58

66
88

93
106

40 9%
20 5%

45
53
57
65
74
41
47
83
74
113
42
8

102
115
138
175
189
96
126
137
128
149
60
44

1267%
117 0%
1421%
169 2%
155 4%
1341%
1681%
65 1 %
72 7%
31 9%
43 8%
450 0%

62
31
37

127
51
49

104 8%
61 9%
34 2%

64
70
70
33
43
42

140
146
146
36
73
49

118 8%
108 6%
108 6%
9 1%
70 7%
15 5%

70
51
92
43

94
51
114
64
38
80

34 3%
0 0%
23 9%
33 3%

48
44
Canceled

0 0%

123 8%
158 6%

$ 351 00

$115 80

Symposium

55

44 7%
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Earth Soi
ASO
SSE
Manned
Planetary
Planetary
ASO
Planetary
Planetary
Planetary
Planetary
Planetary
Manned
Planetary
Planetary
Planetary
Heliophysics
Planetary
Planetary
Planetary
Planetary
Earth Sci
ASO
Planetary
Earth Sci
Planetary
Manned
Earth Sci
Planetary
Planetary
Earth Sci
Heliophysics
Heliophysics
Heliophysics
Heliophysics
ASO
Manned
Heliophysics
ASO
Heliophysics
Heliophysics
Earth Sci

LCROSS
LDCM
LISA
LRO
LTMCC
Lunar
MAGELLAN
MAP
MAPorWMAP
MPL
MCO
MEDS
MER
MER-AorMER03SPIRIT)
MER-B (Opportunity)
MERCURY
Messenger
MGS
MMM
MMS
MRO
MSL
NEAR
New Horizons
NMP
NPP
NSCAT
NuStar
Mars Observer
OCO
ODYSSEY
OMV
OSTM
PATHFINDER
Phoenix/Scout 7
QUICKSCAT
RHESSI wasHESSI
Rosetta
Sampex
SDO
Sea Winds
SET-1
SIM
SLWT
SNOE
SOFIA
SoHO
Solar Orbiter
Solar B or HINODE
SORCE

ofDeniaJ
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$87 10
$56 20
$ 322 80
$ 8 8 30

$ 7 6 90
$ 5 6 60
$856 00
$9420

-117%
0 7%
165 2%
6 7%

$ 183 60
$ 201 70
$499 40

$ 189 70
$21010
$ 767 00

3 3%
4 2%
53 6%

$ 196 92
$191 50
$ 140 20

$ 384 00
$ 288 70
$ 130 70

95 0%
50 8%
-6 8%

$334 40
$ 650 00
$ 150 00

$450 0
$ 2,300 00
$124 90

34 6%
253 8%
-16 7%

$111 70

$176 40

57 9%

$100 40

$ 255 00

154 0%

$ 306 00

$ 994 00

224 8%

$ 267 20
$ 236 00

$ 36610
$ 814 00

37 0%
244 9%

$ 150 00

$174 20

161%

$28 40

$40 10

41 2%

$130 20

$148 80

27
38
55
38

28
38
120
39

3 7%
0 0%
118 2%
2 6%

30
61
56
54
45
39

34
73
64
61
46
45

10 7%
19 7%
14 4%
13 0%
2 2%
16 6%

34

34

1 1%

35
35

35
36

0 0%
2 9%

46
31
31
85
43
45
29
44

57
34
35
85
47

23 7%
8 7%
12 9%
0 0%
9 4%

29
44

0 0%
0 0%

79

123

55 7%

37
126
67
34

26 0%
28 8%
3 0%

74
49
41
21
53

2 8%
30 6%
0 0%
50 0%
71 0%

37
52

38
68

2 7%
30 8%

39
73

89
191

128 2%
161 6%

35
207
72
84
83
55

52 2%
331 3%
14 3%

100
52
33
Canceled
72
38
41
14
31

14 3%

$172 50

$129 00

-25 2%

$ 234 80

$ 840 00

257 8%

23
48
63

$99 30
$68 00

$80 40
$74 50

-19 0%
9 6%

58
32
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Shuttle
Shuttle - With Reserves
Shuttle - Endeavor
SSME
Space Station
SIRTForSpitzer
SRM
SS
ST-5
ST-6
ST-7
ST-8
ST-9
STARDUST
STDRS
Heliophysics STEREO
ASO
SWAS
SWASTR
SWIFT
ASO
TDRS7
TDRS-H
TDRS-I
TDRS-J
TE
TERRA
Earth Sci
Earth Sci
Terriers
Tether
Heliophysics THEMIS
Heliophysics TIMED
TOPEX
Topex/Poseidon
Earth Sci
Heliophysics TRACE
TRDS
Tnana Spacecraft
Earth Sci
TRMM
TSS
UARS
Earth Sci
Heliophysics Ulysses
Heliophysics WIND
WIRE
ASO
ASO
WISE
Manned
X-30
Manned
X-33 - Canceled
X-34 - Canceled
Manned
X-38 - Canceled
Manned
Manned
X-43 Hyper-X Canceled
ASO
XTE or RXTE

Manned
Manned
Manned
Manned
Manned
ASO
Manned
Manned
Heliophysios
Heliophysics
ASO
Heliophysics
CT
Planetary

2009 Cost Estimating

A History of Denial

$5,800 00
$6,960 00
$2,100 00
$1,26710
$9,446 24
$ 472 00
$ 338 60
$2512
$26 30

$117 80
$341 40
$150 00
$47 30
$ 140 00
$ 102 40
$ 269 00

$17,789 00 206 7%
$17,789 00 155 6%
$1,800 00 -14 3%
$ 3,051 50 140 8%
$45,000 00 376 4%
$712 00
50 8%
$ 706 70 108 7%
$28 94
15 2%
487
85 2%

$126 4
$ 532 00
$ 550 00
$78 90
$ 212 70
$164 90
$ 532 00

7 3%
55 8%
266 7%
66 8%
51 9%
61 0%
97 8%

$ 321 30
$1,078 70

$401 50
$1,393 20

25 0%
29 2%

$28 30
$ 102 30
$ 129 20
$438 00

$11570
$ 107 60
$176 20
$ 520 00

308 8%
5 2%
36 4%
18 7%

$35 60
$ 899 80
$75 00
$ 218 80
$ 4 0 70
$ 575 30
$ 196 00

$40 30
$ 80310
$96 90
$458 00
$ 263 00
$ 790 00
$460 00

13 2%
-10 7%
29 2%
113 9%
546 2%
37 3%
134 7%

$39 70

$ 5 0 70

27 7%

$3,100 00
$1 075 20
$70 00
$ 500 00
$167 00
$ 100 00

$10,000 00
$ 1 789 70
$ 378 00
$ 1,500 00
$ 227 00
$ 373 00

222 6%
66 5%
440 0%
200 0%
35 9%
273 0%

Page 109

Symposium

55

88

601%

48

62 5%

47
37
42
35

78
56
89
32
42
39

89 4%
-13 5%
0 0%
10 9%

49
57

77
116

57 1%
104 2%

41

60

45 1%

41
47
53

52
73
82

26 8%
55 3%
54 7%

31

56

80 6%

37
44

44
86

17 6%
97 1%

105
26

151
52

43 8%
101 2%

72

87

21 0%

73
40
48
44
42
Canceled
Canceled
Canceled
Canceled
Canceled
53

95
132
71
57
59

30 1%
230 0%
47 9%
30 7%
40 5%

48

-9 4%
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